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I. THE SUPREME COURT AT THE CROSSROADS OF
POWER
Who indeed is the most dangerous member of the Supreme
Court? In The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Mathematics,1 published during 1996 in the South-
ern California Law Review, we developed a game-theoretic
model for assessing differences in voting power among the Jus-
1. Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Su-
preme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Dangerous Justice].
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tices. In response to criticism by Professor Lynn A. Baker,2 we
refined this model in "Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About
the Supremes as the Sultans of Swing, also published in the
Southern California Law Review. 3
The time has come for a sober second look at voting power
on the Supreme Court. The Presidential election of 2000 repre-
sented a watershed moment in public awareness of the high
court's internal politics.4 The Court's prominent role in break-
ing the electoral deadlock has shaken "the Nation's confidence
in the [Justices] as... impartial guardian[s] of the rule of
law."5 The longest election night in living memory intensified
interest in the putatively "'conservative' coalition of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Associate Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas,"6 which decided Bush v. Gore and numerous
other high-profile cases during the preceding decade. Journal-
istic attention centered once again on Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, the only Justices not to have signed an opinion in
Bush v. Gore and the subject of speculation over the authorship
of the per curiam opinion that ended the 2000 Presidential con-
test.
7
Surprised and disappointed though voters might have
been, sophisticated observers have always understood that the
2. Lynn A. Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common
Sense in the Search for the Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187 (1996).
3. Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, "Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About
the Supremes as the Sultans of Swing, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 219 (1996) [hereinafter
Sultans of Swingi.
4. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Supreme Court: Should We Trust Judges?,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at Ml; Michael W. McConnell, A Muddled Ruling,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2000, at A26; Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIc, Dec.
25, 2000, at 18; Evan P. Schultz, Justice Unrobed, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000,
at 70; Herman Schwartz, The God That Failed, THE NATION, Jan. 1, 2001, at 5.
See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMiELA S. KARLAN & RIcHARD H. PILDEs,
WHEN ELECTIONs Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOcRAcY AND THE PREsiDENTIAL
ELECTION OF 2000 (2001).
5. See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 542 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf.,
e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change
in our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is
little different from the two political branches of the Government. No
misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court. .. ."). But cf James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 550 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("[When the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it.").
6. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 87.
7. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for
Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al.
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Supreme Court's internal dynamics are inherently political. 8
"[L]aw, as it is generated by the Supreme Court, is the long-
term product of short-term strategic decision making."9 The po-
litically savvy realize that possession of "high political powers"
heightens the value "of strategy and tactics" to each of the Jus-
tices and to the Court as an institution. 10
The 2000 election also represented a milestone in executive
and judicial continuity. Since the beginning of October Term
1994-from the midpoint of Bill Clinton's first term to the end
of the Clinton presidency-the Supreme Court has experienced
no turnover. In honor of the lively interplay between President
Clinton's appointments and the Rehnquist Court crafted by
earlier Republican administrations,11 we may call today's Jus-
tices by the collective name of the "Clinton-Rehnquist" Court.
Whatever else the Clinton-Rehnquist Court may accomplish be-
fore it disbands, it has already achieved exceptional stability in
personnel. Frequent turnover in membership has been a Su-
preme Court tradition. Only one other collection of Justices
has remained intact for a stretch exceeding seven Terms. 12 In-
deed, every President except William Harrison, Zachary Taylor,
Andrew Johnson, and Jimmy Carter has managed to nominate
8. See generally, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
STRATEGY (1964).
9. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE, at xiii
(1998).
10. Eugene V. Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the
Profession, 34 ROCKYMTN. L. REV. 123, 142 (1962).
11. Between President Johnson's appointment of Thurgood Marshall in
1967 and President Clinton's appointment of Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1993,
Republican Presidents appointed an unbroken string of two Chief Justices and
nine Associate Justices. See The Supreme Court Historical Society, at
http://www.supremecourthistory.orgfp/courtlist.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that losing an entire generation of
Supreme Court appointments by Democratic Presidents had any measurable
impact on the Court's jurisprudence. See Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme
Court Really Needs to Know It Learned from the Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REV.
459 (1997) (arguing that the current Supreme Court is no more conservative
than the Warren Court).
12. Only three times have gaps as long as six years intervened between
Supreme Court appointments. No Justices joined the Court between John Paul
Stevens in 1975 and Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981. Louis D. Brandeis and John
H. Clarke were appointed in 1916; Pierce Butler and George Sutherland joined
the Court in 1922. The longest gap, twelve years, took place after the
appointments of Joseph Story and Gabriel Duvall in 1811. No new app-
ointments to a seven-Justice Court occurred until Smith Thompson was
appointed in 1823. See The Supreme Court Historical Society, at
http'//www.supremecourthistory.org/fp/courtlist.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
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at least one Supreme Court Justice.13 We therefore have a
unique opportunity to test hypotheses about relative voting
power among the Justices. The decisions delivered during the
seven Terms since Stephen Breyer became the 108th Justice
permit a full reconsideration of previously outlined models for
measuring voting power on the Supreme Court.
True to our mission "to infuse mathematical rigor into the
study of Supreme Court voting,"14 we now revisit our theories
in light of events since 1996. Part II of this Article restates, in
abbreviated form, three models of voting power that we devel-
oped in 1996. It also presents three variants of an alternative
model proposed by Professor Lynn Baker of the University of
Texas School of Law. Her model differs from ours most dra-
matically in its assumption that there is a "median" voter on
the Supreme Court. Under Professor Baker's view of the Court,
every case can be aligned along a single ideological dimension,
and the Justice whose ideology falls in the fourth position from
either extreme will cast a decisive "swing" vote.
Taking full advantage of the additional five Supreme Court
Terms now available to us, Part III of this Article uses the full
set of cases decided by the Clinton-Rehnquist Court to test six
separate models of judicial voting power. We cast serious doubt
on one of our own measures and two of Professor Baker's. Our
most sophisticated model, designed to emulate the ebb and flow
of power on the Court, loses its accuracy over time and supplies
no meaningful information over the long run. The artifice of in-
ferring hypothetically feasible five-Justice coalitions from actu-
ally observed coalitions of any size eventually generates so
much information that it blurs power differences among the
Justices. One of Professor Baker's models attributes too much
power to unanimous decisions, which reveal nothing about the
Court's coalitional dynamics. The other exposes the distorting
impact of the Court's docket on Professor Baker's analysis.
From the remaining models, we stage anew the Power Pageant
13. Harrison and Taylor had the excuse of dying in office, though James
Garfield managed an appointment (Stanley Matthews) before an assassin's
bullet truncated his administration. Congress deliberately shrank the
membership of the Court during Johnson's administration to prevent him from
appointing any Justices. Carter could blame only bad luck for his Supreme
Court shutout. See generally THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 775 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) (describing the Judiciary
Acts of 1866 and 1869); id. at 972-77 (listing Supreme Court appointments by
presidential term).
14. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 238.
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of the Justices and crown the Most Dangerous Justice of the
Clinton-Rehnquist Court.
Part IV weighs the relative merits of the three most infor-
mative models of Supreme Court voting power. We conclude
that three different models measure distinct aspects of judicial
power. A relatively simple model based on the number of dis-
tinct five-Justice coalitions provides the most straightforward
gauge of the ability to cast a decisive, tie-breaking vote. A more
sophisticated model measures the degree with which a Justice
can credibly threaten to abandon a tenuous five-Justice coali-
tion. Finally, the rudimentary method of counting the number
of distinct winning coalitions measures each Justice's marginal
propensity to win. The predictive powers of these measures ul-
timately justify the use of game theory to gauge voting power
on the Supreme Court.
II. THE POWER PAGEANT OF THE JUSTICES REVISITED
A. THE MOST DANGEROUS JUSTICE
This project grew out of frustration with the casual nature
of knowledge about voting power on the Supreme Court. Gen-
erally speaking "[j]udicial strategy is not much considered by
legal scholars." 5 What literature there is often adopts an in-
formal approach. Somewhere in the anecdotal fog between por-
trayals of the Justices as active strategists and as passive
swing voters, we endeavored to craft a mathematically sound
model for measuring the relative strength of each Supreme
Court Justice. 16 The keys to the mystery of judicial power, we
hoped, lay in mastery of the mathematics underlying the Jus-
tices' votes.
1. Methodology
"[T]he true test of voting power is the ability to cast a tie-
breaking, or 'critical,' vote."' In 1966, John H. Banzhaf III de-
veloped an index for analyzing voting systems by this crite-
rion. 18 No less an authority than the Supreme Court has ex-
15. Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 511 (1998)
(reviewing EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9).
16. See Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 64-66.
17. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 145 n.23 (1971).
18. See John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical
Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 317 (1965).
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plained the Banzhaf index:
In a population of n voters, where each voter has a choice between
two alternatives (candidates), there are 2' possible voting combina-
tions. For example, with a population of three voters, A, B, and C,
and two candidates, X and Y, there are eight combinations:
ABC
#1. XXX
#2. XXY
#3. XYX
#4. XYY
#5. YXX
#6. YXY
#7. YYX
#8. YYY
.... In th[is] population of three voters..., any voter can cast a
critical vote in four situations; in the other four situations, the vote is
not critical since it cannot change the outcome of the election. For ex-
ample, C can cast a tie-breaking vote only in situations 3, 4, 5, and 6.
The number of combinations in which a voter can cast a tie-breaking
vote is
2- (n-l)!
((n-I)/2)! - ((n-I)/2)!
where n is the number of voters. Dividing this result (critical votes)
by 2' (possible combinations), one arrives at that fraction of possible
combinations in which a voter can fist a critical vote. This is...
[Banzhafs] measure of voting power.
One skeptical Justice has quipped that "[t]he only relevant
difference between... the elementary probability theory [de-
veloped by] Professor Banzhaf' and "the elementary arithme-
tic" which characterizes legal applications of Banzhafs work "is
that calculations in the [former] field cannot be done on one's
fingers."20 The Banzhaf index nevertheless enjoys broad legal
currency. The equitable reallocation of voting power among
member-states holds the key to eastward expansion of the
European Union.2' A generation ago, scholars subjected Cana-
dian constitutional reform to a similar exercise in game the-
ory.22 Closer to home, work by Banzhaf and other game theo-
19. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 145 n.23.
20. Id. at 168 n.2 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.).
21. See The Many Tricky Ways of Widening Europe, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9,
2000, at 55. See generally, e.g., Council Decision No. 98/260, 1998 O.J. (L 121)
(outlining conditions for Poland's accession to the European Union).
22. See D.R. Miller, A Shapley Value Analysis of the Proposed Canadian
Constitutional Amendment Scheme, 6 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 140 (1973).
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rists has informed the resolution of American voting rights
cases23 and even illuminated the equities of the electoral col-
lege. 2
4
Compared with other institutions, the Supreme Court has
received little attention from students of relative voting
strength.25 Our 1996 articles sought to transform the Court
from a mere consumer of the Banzhaf index into an apt subject
for its application. We began with the simple assumption "that
the only time that an individual Justice's vote matters is when
he [or she] is in a coalition of exactly five Justices."26 We re-
peat: The true test of voting power lies in the ability to break
ties. Because "the defection of any one Justice would make los-
ers of the other four," we initially assumed that each Justice
should be regarded "as much a 'swing voter' as any of the oth-
ers in this fragile coalition."
27
These assumptions suggest that voting power may be
measured simply by counting the number of unique five-Justice
coalitions that appear over some period and dividing by five the
number of times each Justice appears in coalitions of this
sort.28 A tally of five-Justice coalitions in each Supreme Court
Term can be derived from the Harvard Law Review's annual
list of 5-4 decisions in the previous Term,29 augmented by
23. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 925 n.23 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citing John F. Banzhaf III, Multi-Member Electoral
Districts-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle?, 75 YALE L.J.
1309 (1966)); Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 146 n.23; id. at 168-70 (separate opinion of
Harlan, J.); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 125 n.3 (1967) (per curiam); see also
Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 697-99 (1989) (rejecting the "Banzhaf
Index" as applied to a borough-by-borough voting scheme within New York
City's municipal government); id. at 704 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ('I ... suspect the Court is correct in rejecting the
Banzhaf Index....").
24. See Morris, 489 U.S. at 607-99; Irwin Mann & L.S. Shapley, The A
Priori Voting Strength of the Electoral College, in GAME THEORY AND RELATED
APPROACHES TO SocIAL BEHAVIOR 151-63 (Martin Shubik ed., 1964); John H.
Banzhaf I, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral
College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304 (1968); Guillermo Owen, Evaluation of a
Presidential Election Game, 69 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 947 (1975).
25. See Baker, supra note 2, at 189; see also id. at 200 (explaining in greater
detail "why aficionados of the Shapley-Shuhik and Banzhaf Indexes have shown
little interest in studying the Supreme Court").
26. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 66.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 71-72.
29. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 111, 343 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 Harvard Survey].
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deeper legal analysis of decisions that do not fit Harvard's rela-
tively rigid criteria. 30 Harvard requires that five Justices dis-
agree with four on outcome as well as reasoning. By contrast,
we will recognize a five-member coalition as long as exactly five
Justices join the same opinion, regardless of the Court's overall
alignment on the disposition of a case. Neither Harvard nor we
regard "two Justices as having agreed if they did not join the
same opinion, even if they agreed in the result of the case and
wrote separate opinions revealing very little philosophical dis-
agreement."31 Opinions, after all, represent "the maturing of
collective [judicial] thought" and consequently outweigh mere
agreement in result as a measure of the Justices' propensity to
cooperate. 32 We therefore treat the increasingly fashionable
opinion concurring in the judgment merely as another species
of dissent.
33
We should clarify another aspect of our methodology. We
have consciously chosen to count only the number of different
coalitions-whether observed, inferred, or theoretical-and to
ignore the number of cases decided by a particular coalition.
We believe that "[ulseful distinctions among individual Jus-
tices' voting power.., depend less on the number of times a
particular coalition is successful and more on the number of dif-
ferent coalitions that each individual Justice is ideologically
able to join."34 One could, of course, incorporate the frequency
of coalitions in a measurement of voting power on the Supreme
Court. Weighing each five-Justice coalition according to the
likelihood of its occurrence could yield a stochastic measure of
Supreme Court voting power.35 That methodology, however,
presents severe technical hurdles whose resolution would re-
quire an altogether different paper.
30. See Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 69-70 & n.32, 71 & n.45.
31. 1994 Harvard Survey, supra note 29, at 342 n.f; accord Dangerous
Justice, supra note 1, at 79-80.
32. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84,100 (1959).
33. See Robert W. Bennett, A Dissent on Dissent, 74 JUDICATURE 255
(1990).
34. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 69.
35. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 2, at 202; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 27, 43-46
(1995); cf Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing: Explaining the
Size of Supreme Court Majorities, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1225, 1226 (2000) (exploring
the frequency of coalitions of specific sizes in the Supreme Court's record of
decisions).
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Indeed, that paper has already been written. Arthur
Frank and Lloyd Shapley applied the Shapley-Shubik index to
October Term 1977.3 - In our initial 1996 article, we reviewed
and rejected Frank and Shapley's methodology.37 Among other
reasons, their application of the Shapley-Shubik index contains
"an inherent additive measure ... which is not present in the
Banzhaf index."38  "[T]he Shapley-Shubik index depends on
equiprobable permutations of N, whereas the Banzhaf index
depends on equiprobable combinations."39 Our chief critic, who
frequently applies the Shapley-Shubik index in her own work,4°
acknowledges the difficulty in translating information derived
from observed combinations of Justices into ideologically ar-
rayed permutations containing a "single pivot.'Al
2. Naive Index
From these basic assumptions, we derived what we called
our "naive index" of voting power. "[Olver a Term or a stretch
of Terms, an individual Justice's voting power may be ex-
pressed as the percentage of the time that the Justice [takes
part] in a five-member coalition, less the eighty percent of the
voting power attributable to the four other members of each
coalition.' 42 For example, in October Term 1994, Chief Justice
Rehnquist appeared in seven of eleven five-Justice coalitions.
43
For him and for each of the Associate Justices, "we compute[d]
the number of times that [each] Justice appeared in a five-
Justice coalition, divided by the total number of five-Justice
coalitions in the relevant time period, and multiplied by 20 (in
36. See ARTHUR Q. FRANK & LLOYD SHAPLEY, THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (A RAND Note, N-1735-NSF, RAND Corp. 1981).
See generally L. S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, A Method for Evaluating the
Distribution of Power in a Committee System, 48 AM. POL. SC. REV. 787 (1954);
ALAN D. TAYLOR, MATHEMATICS AND POLITICS: STRATEGY, VOTING, POWER AND
PROOF 65-71 (1995) (explaining the Shapley-Shubik index).
37. See Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 76-80.
38. MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONCEPTS
AND SOLUTIONs 204 (1982).
39. Id. at 203-04.
40. See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public
Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 730 (1991); Lynn A. Baker,
Federalism: The Argument from Article V, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 923, 927-32
(1997); Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose
Time Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21,24-29 (1997).
41. Baker, supra note 2, at 191-92.
42. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 66.
43. See id. at 70-71.
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order to reflect the assumption that each Justice in a five-
member coalition wields 20 percent of the Court's power).""
"[Multiplying the [resulting] power index by nine" yields a ju-
dicial quotient (JQ) on a scale where 100 expresses "exactly the
amount of power that [an average Justice] should expect to
wield.'4 5 JQ is to judicial power as IQ is to mental aptitude.
We calculated that Chief Justice Rehnquist enjoyed a naive
power index of 12.7 during the 1994 Term and a JQ of 114,
slightly above benchmarks of 11.1 and 100.
There are, however, slight discrepancies between our 1996
articles and this renewed look at the Supreme Court. After re-
examining the 1994 Term, we now calculate that Chief Justice
Rehnquist scored 13.8 on the naive power index, equivalent to a
JQ of 125. Given the larger temporal scope of this study, we
conducted de novo analysis of each Term's cases before subject-
ing them anew to our measures of voting power. We found a
slightly larger number of coalitions in each of the 1994 and
1995 Terms.46 We believe that minor variations in the me-
chanical application of our indexes do not impugn their under-
lying theoretical integrity.
3. Sophisticated Index
Our second index arises from a crucial twist on Banzhafs
theme: ideological difference. In refining our model of judicial
voting, we abandoned "the traditional game-theoretic assump-
tion that all potential coalitions among Supreme Court Justices
are equally likely.'47 In light of the Justices' ideological pro-
pensities and observed voting behavior, we assumed that cer-
tain coalitions attracting a precise combination of Justices and
excluding all others will not emerge.48  The Shapley-Shubik
model's contrary assumption-that Justices are unconstrained
in their ability to form, break, and reassemble winning blocs-
cannot withstand this realistic assessment of ideological di-
44. Id. at 71-72.
45. Id. at 72-73.
46. We originally found seventy-four coalitions in each of these Terms and a
total of 108 coalitions in these two Terms combined. See id. at 83. Closer
scrutiny revealed seventy-nine coalitions in October Term 1994, seventy-six
coalitions in October Term 1995, and a total of 113 coalitions in the two Terms
combined.
47. Id. at 68; see also id. at 67 ("We deliberately reject [those] ....
applications of game theory [that] assume that coalitions may freely form within
any given population of voters.").
48. See id. at 67-68.
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vides within the Court.49
If in fact "some blocs" of Justices "simply will not form,"
50
then we cannot assume "that every Justice in a five-Justice
[coalition] is equally likely to defect."51 "Each 5-4 decision," af-
ter all, represents two distinct coalitions-one "embod[ying] a
set of legal propositions with which all members of the prevail-
ing... majority agree" and another hoping to attract a fifth
vote from what is, for the moment, a fragile winning alliance.
52
In order to represent a credible threat to abandon the winning
coalition, a defecting Justice must demonstrate a certain "de-
gree of ideological independence" from the four remaining
members of that coalition. 53 In other words, the rump four-
Justice minority left in the wake of the would-be defector must
itself be "feasible"-in the sense that this incipient coalition
would adopt at least one unique set of legal propositions "to the
complete exclusion of the other Justices."5p The hallmark of
every feasible coalition is the existence of "some legal proposi-
tion on which [those] Justices and only [those Justices] would
agree."55 If those "four Justices... do not themselves form a
feasible coalition, this is a reliable signal that the would-be de-
fector is too ideologically bound to the other four" and that a
"threat by this Justice to defect would not be credible."56 A Jus-
tice who "has not demonstrated sufficient ideological independ-
ence to abandon the rest of the coalition" ought not be assigned
the voting power otherwise attributable to his or her contribu-
tion to a five-Justice coalition.
57
A more sophisticated measure of voting power on the Su-
preme Court therefore arises from an acknowledgement of the
limits on the number of feasible coalitions that a group of ideo-
logically diverse Justices can attain. By normalizing the re-
sults of the naive survey to account for nonfeasible coalitions,
we derived what we now call the "sophisticated index" of voting
49. See Saul Brenner, The Shapley-Shubik Power Index and Supreme Court
Behavior, 15 JURIMETRICs J. 194, 198 (1975); Glendon Schubert, The Power of
Organized Minorities in a Small Group, 9 ADMIN. SC. Q. 133, 142 (1964).
50. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 68.
51. Id. at 73.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 82 (emphasis deleted).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 83.
57. Id.
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power among the Justices. Though implicit in our 1996 arti-
cles, this index was never explicitly computed. We now include
it in this fresh look at Supreme Court voting power.
4. Generalized Banzhaf Index
One final methodological challenge remains. In the short
run, measuring feasibility through direct observation can be
frustrating. For any five-Justice majority, we must test as
many as five lesser-included coalitions in order to determine
which four-Justice alliances are feasible. Consider the notori-
ous conservative bloc of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Assessing whether
Chief Justice Rehnquist is a credible threat to defect would re-
quire either (1) finding a corresponding coalition consisting
solely of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, or
(2) being confident that the failure to observe this particular
four-Justice coalition over a given period of time provides
meaningful evidence of the Chief Justice's inability to abandon
these four colleagues. When the operative time frame is a sin-
gle Supreme Court Term, a theoretically feasible rump coali-
tion may not appear. The corresponding Justice then receives
no credit for what would otherwise be his or her share of a win-
ning five-Justice majority's voting power. For this reason, sin-
gle-Term applications of our sophisticated index are often stud-
ded with zero ratings for some Justices.
Although we anticipated that a group of ideologically dis-
tinct Justices would eventually exhaust its capacity to cooper-
ate, we did not expect that any single Term would permit a
meaningful test of this assumption. The Court now decides
scarcely half of its traditional "one hundred fifty cases per
year."58 The 129 opinions handed down during the 1990 Term
dwindled to a mere 84 by the 1999 Term. 9 (During the 2000
58. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some
Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987). See generally LEE EPSTEIN ET
AL., THE SUPREE COURT COMPENDIUm: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEvELOPMENTS
84-85 (2d ed. 1996) (reporting that the Court decided roughly 150 cases by full
opinion throughout the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt and again during the
1970s and 1980s); Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional
Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1279-80 (2001) (tracing the contraction of the Supreme
Court's docket from a peak of 231 full opinions in the 1924 Term to eighty-nine
in 1994).
59. See The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV.
179, 402 tbl.I (2000) [hereinafter 1999 Harvard Survey].
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Term, the docket rebounded by the grand total of one case).
The decline in the Court's argument calendar cannot be attrib-
uted to a lack of interest in the country's highest legal tribunal.
In two of the Terms since 1994, the Justices disposed of more
cases than in any other Term since the Harvard Law Review
began compiling Supreme Court statistics during the 1948
Term.6 ° In the 1994 Term, the Court disposed of 7132 cases.61
The 1998 Term nearly matched this level of activity with a
docket of 7015 cases.
62
Marked by its "incredibly shrinking" argument calendar,
the Clinton-Rehnquist Court has arguably established no defin-
ing ideology more salient than institutional inaction.63  After
the fashion of the situation comedy Seinfeld, it is a Court about
nothing.64 A single Term of roughly eighty cases can scarcely
illuminate the Court's ideological deep structure. As long as
the Court's caseload contains a steady stream of "peewee" con-
troversies over tax, Indian, and patent law,65 we cannot sur-
mise that the Justices are covering more political ground
through a smaller but more carefully filtered set of cases.
Let us speak as concretely as possible. On a Court of nine
Justices, 512 unique coalitions are possible. That total is sim-
ply 29. (Once again "we adopt the mathematically convenient,
albeit legally nonsensical, convention that the empty coalition
is possible.")67  Out of 512 possible coalitions, 126-or
9! /(4! 5!)-represent winning coalitions of exactly five Jus-
tices. 68 We assume that a Court whose members hold divergent
60. See The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV.
200, 406 & n.h (1999) [hereinafter 1998 Harvard Survey].
61. See 1994 Harvard Survey, supra note 29, at 344 tbl.II.
62. See 1998 Harvard Survey, supra note 60, at 406 tbl.II.
63. David M. O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the
Supreme Court's Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 779 (1997).
64. Cf Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion,
Welfare, and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (1997)
(accusing the federal judiciary of abandoning an earlier era's constitutional
commitment to welfare rights in favor of a "Clintonified" defense of abortion).
65. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 128 (1979) (quoting Justice John Marshall Harlan); accord
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: "Inconsequential" Cases and
Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1996).
66. Cf Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 431-38 (exploring this very possibility).
67. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 83.
68. See id. at 68 n.26. The number of coalitions-or "combinations," in
mathematical convention-consisting of exactly c Justices out of a Court of n
members can be expressed through the following formula:
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ideological convictions and vote honestly according to those dif-
ferences will never form all 126 five-Justice coalitions, let alone
all 512 possible coalitions. Our 1996 articles, based as they
were on the 1994 and 1995 Terms, operated on too small a
sample of cases to test this assumption directly. Our initial
survey of those Terms revealed only seventy-four actual coali-
tions in each Term, "ranging from single dissents to the grand
coalition of all Justices in a unanimous Court," and a total of
108 unique, actually observed coalitions in the two Terms com-
bined.69
Time has borne out our suspicions. Even after seven
Terms, the Justices have not approached the theoretical limits
on the number of coalitions they may form. The number of ob-
served coalitions is growing slowly. This holds true for five-
Justice coalitions, all majority coalitions, coalitions consisting
of four or more Justices, and all coalitions:
n!
c! (n-c)!
69. Id. at 83. As noted earlier, we have since recalibrated the number of
observed coalitions at seventy-nine for the 1994 Term, seventy-six for the 1995
Term, and 113 for the two Terms combined. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text; see also infra p. 146 tbl.1.
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Table 1: Number of Observed Coalitions
Supreme 5-Justice All Coalitions > All
Court Term(s) coalitions majority 4 Justices coalitions
coalitions
Limit: 126 Limit: 256 Limit: 382 Limit: 512
OT 1994 13 36 47 79
1994-95 17 51 65 113
1994-96 22 62 82 137
1994-97 27 76 103 170
1994-98 30 84 114 185
1994-99 35 90 126 198
1994-2000 37 95 133 209
To simplify the analysis, consider only the trend in five-
Justice coalitions. (This narrow focus would suffice for pur-
poses of our naive index. Growth in the number of four-Justice
coalitions is pertinent to our sophisticated index, and the num-
ber of all coalitions, especially those that achieve a majority,
drives our generalized Banzhaf index.) From October Term
1994 to October Term 2000, the number of distinct five-Justice
coalitions has risen from thirteen to thirty-seven. In no year
did the cumulative number of observed five-Justice coalitions
grow by more than five. Although the sitting Court has main-
tained its personnel for seven Terms, it has yet to reveal any-
thing close to the theoretical number of different five-Justice
coalitions. Thirty-seven is substantially less than 126, and
even under generous assumptions, the number of observed five-
Justice coalitions will not approach the theoretical limit for an-
other fifteen years. Perhaps greater diversity in the Court's
docket, combined with ideological evolution on the part of indi-
vidual Justices, will eventually allow any group of nine jurists
to exhaust their cooperative potential. The actuarial expecta-
tion of such an event, however, is forbiddingly low. "In the long
run we [really] are all dead."70
To bridge the gap between the low number of actually ob-
served coalitions and the greater but still delimited number of
70. JoHN MAYNARD KEYNEs, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923).
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feasible coalitions, we devised an artifice for inferring feasibil-
ity from a limited number of decisions. To augment the feasible
coalitions used in the computation of our sophisticated index,
we derived a fuller "set of feasible coalitions from the intersec-
tion of any collection of actual coalitions" observed "during a
Term" or over a series of Terms.71 The existence of a feasible
four-Justice coalition, for example, means "that there is some
legal proposition on which these four Justices and only these
four would agree."72 Our original computations yielded 308 fea-
sible coalitions in the 1994 Term, 228 in the 1995 Term, and
398 in the two Terms combined.73 We used this set of inferred
coalitions to compute our final and most elaborate measure of
Supreme Court power, which we called a generalized Banzhaf
index.
Two six-Justice coalitions from the 1994 Term demonstrate
how our method could and did predict the emergence of feasible
but previously unobserved coalitions.74 Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
agreed long enough to decide a substantial portion of Witte v.
United States.75 A second six-Justice coalition, consisting of
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, decided four cases during that Term.7 6 The five-Justice
alliance that we derived from the intersection of these six-
Justice blocs never actually coalesced during the 1994 Term.
During the 1995 Term, however, this coalition-namely, Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-
fulfilled its promise of feasibility when it delivered the crucial
five votes that decided Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc.7
7
At least on the scale of a single Supreme Court Term, the
difference between the naive and generalized Banzhaf indexes
can be dramatic. In October Term 1995, for instance, Justice
Ginsburg tied for third in the naive measure, registering a
71. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 82.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 83.
74. This example comes from Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 223-24.
75. 515 U.S. 389 (1995) (O'Connor, J.).
76. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687 (1995) (Stevens, J.); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334
(1995) (Stevens, J.); United States v. Natl Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S.
454 (1995) (Stevens, J.); O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995) (Breyer, J.).
77. 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.).
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power index of 12.5 and a JQ of 113.78 After we took full ac-
count of feasible coalitions, including those inferred from coali-
tions that actually materialized during that Term, our general-
ized Banzhaf index registered 14.9 for Justice Ginsburg.
7 9
With a lead of almost two percentage points over her closest
competitor, Justice Ginsburg enjoyed thirty-four percent more
power than she would expect on a Court of equally flexible Jus-
tices.8 °
In our renewed look at the Power Pageant of the Justices,
Chief Justice Rehnquist experienced an even more dramatic
transformation during October Term 1995. Rated an insipid
7.5 on the naive index (with a corresponding JQ of sixty-eight),
the Chief Justice gained forty points in JQ and rose to a re-
spectable 12.0 under the generalized Banzhaf index.
In sum, we have proposed three ways of measuring Su-
preme Court voting power: (1) a naive index based solely on
five-Justice coalitions, (2) a sophisticated index accounting for
the credibility of defection on the part of each member of each
five-Justice coalition, and (3) a generalized Banzhaf index en-
hancing this crucial notion of feasibility by calculating the in-
tersection of actual observed coalitions. In Part III of this Arti-
cle, we reexamine all of these indexes.
B. LYNN BAKER'S SEARCH FOR THE "MEDIAN" JUSTICE
1. Baker's Standard Measure
If indeed "joining issue is the sincerest form of flattery,"8'
then Professor Lynn Baker has lionized our analysis by propos-
ing an alternative measure of Supreme Court voting power.
Professor Baker effectively equates "the Court's 'most power-
ful" Justice with its "median Justice."82 Game theory, so cen-
tral to our analysis, plays a very limited role in Professor
Baker's approach. At best, she argues, "game theory can...
confirm our intuitions: (1) that one of the Justices in [any
78. See Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 72.
79. See id. at 84.
80. See id. According to our revised figures for October Term 1995, the
generalized Banzhaf index registered 13.6 for Justice Ginsburg, a more modest
improvement over her naive index. The twenty-three percent margin over her
expected voting power nevertheless gave Justice Ginsburg the largest single
share of power among the Justices that Term.
81. Baker, supra note 2, at 187 n.*.
82. Id. at 190.
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given] majority was the true pivot or median Justice in the
case, and (2) that each of the Justices in the majority is equally
likely to have been that swing voter."
8 3
Even a cursory examination of that statement reveals how
fundamentally Professor Baker disagrees with our project.
First, ours emphatically is not a search for the "median" Jus-
tice. Never having equated "the median Justice" with "the
Most Dangerous Justice," we are "ultimately concerned with
each Justice's ability to deliver a 'swing' vote, not with a Jus-
tice's distance from the Court's ideological core."8 4 Mindful of
the Justices' propensity to form "revocable groupings" of con-
stantly shifting coalitions, 85 we assume that the Justices must
"identify issues along multiple dimensions and... balance
their jurisprudential and political preferences along several
axes."' 6 By contrast, Professor Baker "imagines that the Jus-
tices are arrayed along" a single dimension.
8
Second, Professor Baker's assumption "that each of the
Justices in [a] majority is equally likely to have been [the]
swing voter" squarely contradicts our feasibility analysis.88 It
cannot coexist with either our sophisticated index or our gener-
alized Banzhaf index.
Professor Baker's proposed alternative, at the very least,
does have the virtue of simplicity.89 What she touts as "[t]he
most obvious and sensible approach" consists solely of "ex-
amin[ing] all of the Court's decisions during [a] relevant Term,
and simply... count[ing] the number of times each Justice was
a member of a winning coalition of any size (i.e., five6 six, seven,
eight, or nine Justices, or a four-Justice plurality)."9 "The Jus-
83. Id. at 192.
84. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 230; cf Baker, supra note 2, at 201
(asserting that a "Justice who stands at the 'margin' of two groups of her
colleagues necessarily stands at the Court's center" and therefore fulfills "the
very definition of the 'median' Justice in whom Edelman and Chen ultimately
claim to have no interest").
85. S. Sidney Ulmer, Toward a Theory of Sub-Group Formation in the
United States Supreme Court, 27 J. POL. 133, 141 (1965).
86. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 232.
87. Id. at 230; cf Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and
the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 557-65
(1989) (attempting to correlate journalistic assessments of the Justices' ideology
with the Justices' actual votes in civil liberties cases from the 1953 Term to the
1988 Term).
88. Baker, supra note 2, at 192.
89. See Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 233.
90. Baker, supra note 2, at 202.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tice with the highest total is the median Justice for that Term"
and, by Professor Baker's measure of voting power, the Most
Dangerous Justice. 91 We shall borrow Professor Baker's no-
menclature and refer to this yardstick as "Baker's standard
measure."
92
2. Baker's Decision Method
In her critique of our original 1996 article, Professor Baker
accused us of "believ[ing] that the benefits of considering only
the decisions in which the winning coalition numbers precisely
five Justices outweigh the costs of ignoring as much as eighty
percent of the available data."93 As an accommodation of this
purported belief, Professor Baker proposed a simple measure
based on "the number of times each Justice was a member of a
five-Justice majority," under which the Justice "with the high-
est total during the relevant Term" would be crowned "the me-
dian or most powerful Justice."94 As an alternative to the "not
entirely accurate[" name that Professor Baker suggested---"the
'5-4 Decision Method" 95 -we will call this measure "Baker's de-
cision method." Baker's decision method is identical with our
naive index except insofar as it counts multiple instances of
each five-Justice coalition. Our naive index, of course, relies
strictly on the number of unique five-Justice coalitions.
3. Modified Median Measure
In response to Baker's standard measure, we proposed two
adjustments. First, disclaiming interest "in coalitions that lack
the strength to control legal reasoning," we nullified "Professor
Baker's decision to count submajority decisions" and "ignore[d]
all coalitions smaller than five."96 After all, "starting with a
minimal winning coalition is in the spirit of other cooperative
game theory analyses" of Supreme Court decisionmaking.97
This modification apparently has minimal impact; the inclusion
91. Id.
92. Cf id. (describing this method as "the Standard Measure").
93. Id.; see also id. at 193 ("Edelman and Chen ... consider only five-Justice
coalitions"). For our response to this contention, see Sultans of Swing, supra
note 3, at 221-24.
94. Baker, supra note 2, at 202.
95. Id.
96. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 233.
97. Edelman & Sherry, supra note 35, at 1236.
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of submajority coalitions did not materially affect Professor
Baker's assessment of voting power during the 1994 and 1995
Terms. No Justice appeared in more than two submajority coa-
litions credited by Professor Baker. Because the closest gap be-
tween Justices in Professor Baker's standard measure of voting
power was three decisions, 98 ignoring all submajority coalitions
would not affect the Justices' rankings.
A second modification has far greater potential to affect
Professor Baker's search for the median Justice. To minimize
the impact of "docket bias" on the measurement of voting power
during any single Supreme Court Term, we chose not to
"count[] multiple instances of each coalition," as Professor
Baker did, but rather to count only "the number of different
winning coalitions."99 There is no statistically significant corre-
lation between frequency of authorship and power measured
through the Shapley-Shubik index, 100 which after all is the
measurement of power that Professor Baker favors. By
"countfing] the number of different winning coalitions-defined
as coalitions of five or more-that each Justice joined" in any
Term or stretch of Terms, we can easily derive a sense of the
Court's median Justice. 10 In 1996 we computed "median Jus-
tice power ratings" based on these modifications,10 2 and we will
do so again in this study. To distinguish this method from Pro-
fessor Baker's original proposal, we will call it the "modified
median measure."
C. LET THE GAMES BEGIN
We now have three measures derived in varying degrees
from Banzhafs definition of voting power-the naive, sophisti-
cated, and generalized Banzhaf indexes-and three measures
intended to determine the median Justice. Part III of this Arti-
cle will apply all six measures to the decisions of the Supreme
98. See Baker, supra note 2, at 206 tbl.5.
99. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 233-34.
100. See Charles A- Johnson, The Shapley-Shubik Power Index and the
Supreme Court: A Few Empirical Notes, 18 JUtMETRIcs J. 40, 43-44 (1977); see
also id. at 43 n.11 (emphasizing that this methodology measures the number of
opinions written relative to the total number of cases in which a Justice appears
in the majority, so as to control for misleading effects attributable solely to a
Justice's availability to be assigned an opinion); S. Sidney Ulmer, The Use of
Power in the Supreme Court: The Opinion Assignments of Earl Warren, 1953-
1960, 19 J. PUB. L. 49, 54 (1970) (same).
101. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 234.
102. Id. at 235-36.
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Court from the 1994 Term through the 2000 Term. We have at
hand the complete theoretical apparatus and empirical infor-
mation needed to restage the Power Pageant of the Justices. At
stake is the title of Most Dangerous Justice of the Clinton-
Rehnquist Court.
Since the beginning of our project, we have acknowledged
that the need for the "elaborate mathematics" so dreaded by
our chief critic might wither away over time. 103 The slow accre-
tion of decisions may eliminate the need for indirect measures
of feasibility. We developed a technique for inferring feasibility
from observed coalitions because a "single Term's docket" is but
"a limited cross-selection of the vastly more diverse workload
that confronts the Court over a period of years."104 "Over the
long haul," however, "the extraordinary diversity of the Court's
business erodes the docket's effect on the Justices' voting
power."105 For any Justice interested in maximizing leverage
on the bench, the long run puts a premium on ideological flexi-
bility. Each "Justice's relative power... will depend heavily on
his ability to bend at the frontiers of his jurisprudential prefer-
ences."106 For a mathematically inclined observer of the Court,
the long run does not complicate, but rather simplifies. Of
their own force, the "larger number of cases decided by a single
Court [may] obviate the need to rely on a mathematical surro-
gate for the Justices' coalition-building propensities." 10 7
Now that the Court has operated seven Terms with the
same personnel-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Jus-
tices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Breyer-we no longer need to "wait, perhaps
bootlessly, for one group of Supreme Court Justices to accumu-
late a workable record of decisions."108 The Clinton-Rehnquist
Court has decided a sufficiently deep and diverse set of cases to
expose precisely which coalitions among the Justices are feasi-
ble. As observers we can now refine or perhaps even discard
"imperfect but mathematically cogent measure[s] of the Court's
103. Baker, supra note 2, at 190; cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (warning against "the mathematical quagmire" into
which federal judicial supervision of state legislative elections would "catapult1
the lower courts of the country").
104. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 233.
105. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 97.
106. Id.
107. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 225.
108. Id. at 226.
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voting power," which we developed in the absence of more com-
plete information. 0 9 We will therefore conduct another Power
Pageant of the Justices, subjecting our three measures of vot-
ing power-the naive, sophisticated, and generalized Banzhaf
indexes-as well as the standard, decision, and modified meas-
ures of the "median" Justice to an empirical test based on all
Supreme Court decisions rendered in October Terms 1994
through 2000.
Without further ado, let the games begin.
III. THE MOST DANGEROUS JUSTICE RIDES AGAIN
A. VARIATIONS ON A THEME BY BANZHAF
1. Naive Index
We begin with our naive index of Supreme Court power.
Applied Term by Term, this admittedly crude index foreshad-
ows the decisive struggles in the Power Pageant of the Justices.
In the next table and the eleven that follow it, the first line in
each cell reports the amount of voting power-expressed as a
percentage of the Court's overall power-that the Justice in
question wielded during a particular Term. The second line re-
ports a judicial quotient, or JQ, which is merely the correspond-
ing power index multiplied by nine. A benchmark power index
of 11.1%, which is what an average Justice should expect, cor-
responds with a JQ of 100. Herewith the Term-by-Term results
of our naive index:
109. Id.
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Table 2: Naive Index, Term by Term
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 13.8 10.8 10.8 6.2 15.4 12.3 4.6 15.4 10.8
125 97 97 55 138 111 42 138 97
1995 7.5 10.0 15.0 10.0 12.5 15.0 7.5 12.5 10.0
68 90 135 90 113 135 68 113 90
1996 10.0 16.0 8.0 6.0 16.0 14.0 8.0 10.0 12.0
90 144 72 54 144 126 72 90 108
1997 10.9 14.5 10.9 5.5 12.7 10.9 9.1 10.9 14.5
98 131 98 49 115 98 82 98 131
1998 9.1 12.7 10.9 10.9 12.7 10.9 10.9 12.7 9.1
82 115 98 98 115 98 98 115 82
1999 10.9 9.1 12.7 7.3 10.9 14.5 12.7 9.1 12.7
98 82 115 65 98 131 115 82 115
2000 10.0 10.0 7.5 12.5 15.0 12.5 10.0 12.5 10.0
90 90 68 112 135 112 90 90 90
Justice Kennedy dominates these ratings. In every Term
except 1999, he finished no lower than a tie for third. Justice
Souter is almost as consistent and almost as powerful, ap-
proaching or surpassing the benchmark JQ of 100 in every
Term. Every Justice has enjoyed at least one banner year in
which his or her naive power index exceeded 11.1.
Computing the naive power index over time provides a sur-
prisingly vivid measure of the Justices' relative strengths:
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Table 3: Naive Index, Cumulative
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMA DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 13.8 10.8 10.8 6.2 15.4 12.3 4.6 15.4 10.8
125 97 97 55 138 111 42 138 97
94-95 12.9 9.4 12.9 7.1 14.1 12.9 5.9 14.1 10.6
116 85 116 64 127 116 53 127 95
94-96 13.6 10.9 10.0 7.3 14.5 13.6 7.3 12.7 10.0
123 98 90 65 131 123 65 115 90
94-97 12.5 11.9 10.4 6.7 14.1 12.6 8.1 11.9 11.9
113 107 93 60 127 113 73 107 107
94-98 12.7 12.0 10.0 7.3 14.0 12.0 9.3 12.0 10.7
114 108 90 66 126 108 84 108 96
94-99 12.6 11.4 10.3 7.4 14.3 12.6 9.7 10.9 10.9
113 103 93 67 129 113 87 98 98
94-2000 11.9 11.4 9.7 8.1 14.1 12.4 9.7 11.4 11.4
107 102 88 73 126 112 88 102 102
The cumulative computation of the naive index shows sta-
bility over time. Significant variation in power ratings does ex-
ist, and those differences tend to persist. Justices Kennedy and
Souter are able to translate consistently powerful annual per-
formances into domination of the cumulative table. Despite
considerably spottier yearly showings, Chief Justice Rehnquist
has fared reasonably well. The Chief Justice, in fact, has
matched or outperformed Justice Souter after five of seven
Terms in the cumulative naive index, even though Justice
Souter beat the Chief Justice in five of seven annual contests
and tied him in a sixth. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and
Breyer wield almost exactly the voting power that they should
expect. Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Scalia bring up the
rear.
Justices Ginsburg and Thomas exhibit some of the most in-
teresting changes in relative power over time. When we first
examined this problem in 1996, we ranked Justice Ginsburg
among the most powerful Justices. We awarded her the title of
Most Dangerous Justice for October Term 1995.110 Nothing in
110. See Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 95.
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the naive index undermines that decision. During the 1994
and 1995 Terms, Justice Ginsburg wielded nearly three times
the power of Justice Thomas and more than twice that of Jus-
tice Scalia. At her nadir after the 1999 Term, Justice Ginsburg
had shed 4.5 points off her peak performance in the cumulative
naive index. By the end of the 2000 Term, Justice Ginsburg
eased into a three-way tie for fourth place, behind Justice Ken-
nedy, Justice Souter, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
For his part, Justice Thomas surged. In most other cir-
cumstances, a final naive power rating of 9.7 and a JQ of
eighty-eight would not warrant much notice. But in reaching
that level, Justice Thomas more than doubled the power that
he had exerted at the outset. After beginning in the cellar, Jus-
tice Thomas reached parity with Justice Scalia after the 1996
Term and has never trailed since. He now enjoys a substantial
edge over Justice Scalia.
2. Sophisticated Index
Introducing the notion of feasibility initially confounds our
application of Professor Banzhafs measure of voting power.
Thanks to the stringent requirement of proving feasibility
through actual observation of lesser-included coalitions of four
Justices, the annual ratings are pockmarked with zeroes at one
extreme and stratospherically high JQs at the other:
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Table 4: Sophisticated Index, Term by Term
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 13.3 0.0 20.0 13.3 6.7 13.3 0.0 13.3 13.3
120 0 180 120 60 120 0 120 120
1995 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0 30.0 10.0 0.0 20.0 10.0
0 0 180 90 270 90 0 180 90
1996 20.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 30.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0
180 0 180 0 270 90 90 0 90
1997 6.3 6.3 12.5 18.8 12.5 6.3 12.5 12.5 12.5
56 56 113 169 113 56 113 113 113
1998 0.0 11.1 22.2 16.7 16.7 16.7 5.6 5.6 5.6
0 100 200 150 150 150 50 50 50
1999 5.9 5.9 17.6 17.6 11.8 17.6 11.8 0.0 11.8
_ _ 53 53 159 159 106 159 106 0 106
2000 0.0 22.2 22.2 11.1 22.2 22.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
0 200 200 100 200 200 0 0 0
The 2000 Term, to pick but the most recent example, illus-
trates the implausibility of the sophisticated index as an an-
nual measure of Supreme Court voting power. It defies credi-
bility to assert, as this index does, that Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter alone commanded all of
the Court's power, to the complete exclusion of their four col-
leagues. Once feasibility is permitted to work over time, how-
ever, the performance of the sophisticated index improves dra-
matically:
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Table 5: Sophisticated Index, Cumulative
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMR DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 13.3 0.0 20.0 20.0 13.3 6.7 0.0 13.3 13.3
120 0 180 180 120 60 0 120 120
94-95 14.3 0.0 19.0 14.3 14.3 9.5 0.0 19.0 9.5
129 0 171 129 129 86 0 171 86
94-96 19.4 0.0 16.7 8.3 13.9 13.9 2.8 13.9 11.1
175 0 150 75 125 125 25 125 100
94-97 15.4 7.7 11.5 9.6 15.4 13.5 5.8 9.6 11.5
138 69 104 87 138 121 52 87 104
94-98 12.9 9.7 11.3 9.7 14.5 12.9 8.1 11.3 9.7
116 87 102 87 131 116 73 102 87
94-99 11.4 7.6 10.1 10.1 15.2 16.5 10.1 8.9 10.1
103 76 91 91 137 148 91 80 91
94-2000 10.6 7.1 9.4 10.6 14.1 18.8 10.6 8.2 10.6
95 64 85 95 127 169 95 74 95
Justices Kennedy and Souter again dominate the rankings.
Relative to the naive index, however, the sophisticated index
seems prone to occasional seismic shifts. Justice Souter had
never eclipsed Justice Kennedy until the 1999 Term. Indeed,
he began with exactly half of Justice Kennedy's power. In the
1999 Term, however, Justice Souter gained 3.6 points on his
power index and skyrocketed past Justice Kennedy and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, two colleagues whom he had trailed in the
cumulative naive index and in the Term-by-Term application of
the sophisticated index. He continued his surge in the 2000
Term, finishing with an astonishing 18.8 index and a forty-two-
point lead in JQ over his closest competitor, Justice Kennedy.
In all, Justice Souter gained nearly six percentage points in his
power rating in two Terms.
At the close of the 2000 Term, Justice Kennedy neverthe-
less retained an impressive amount of power. With a JQ of
127, he exceeds his expected power by more than a quarter. At
a lower level of power, Justice Thomas has registered impres-
sive gains in recent Terms. Since the end of the 1997 Term,
Justice Thomas has added nearly five points to his index and
practically doubled his JQ. Over the same period, Chief Justice
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Rehnquist lost as much strength as Justice Thomas gained,
shedding 4.8 index points and forty-three points of JQ. From
his peak at the end of October Term 1996, the Chief Justice has
lost nearly half of his power. As in the cumulative naive index,
Justice Ginsburg has also fallen sharply over time. Since the
end of the 1995 Term, she has dropped a whopping 10.8 index
points and ninety-seven points in JQ. She lost more power
than six other Justices on the Court hold. These dramatic
shifts have vaulted Justice Thomas and relegated Chief Justice
Rehnquist into a four-way tie for third. For her part, Justice
Ginsburg now languishes in eighth place.
The sophisticated index is particularly cruel to Justice Ste-
vens, who alone occupies last place with half of the power
wielded by the runner-up, Justice Kennedy. Indeed, for the
first three Terms of our study period, the cumulative sophisti-
cated index awarded Justice Stevens none of the Court's voting
power. After seven Terms, he holds a scant 7.1% of the Court's
power and lags in last place by a substantial margin.
Justice O'Connor's performance in the sophisticated index
warrants special mention. On a Term-by-Term basis, she has
achieved remarkably high ratings. Indeed, only in the 1997
Term did she fail to approach or reach the eye-popping JQ of
200. In our cumulative application of the sophisticated index,
however, Justice O'Connor steadily ebbed from an initial index
of 20.0 and JQ of 180 to less than half those levels of power.
Her final rating under the sophisticated index-an index of 9.4
and a JQ of eighty-five-is consistent with her assessment un-
der the naive index.
From this story we draw two conclusions. First, as a mat-
ter of method, Justice O'Connor's performance demonstrates
that the cumulative application of our naive and sophisticated
indexes does not follow in linear fashion from the yearly ver-
sion of those indexes. The cumulative analysis differs dramati-
cally from the average of the yearly indexes. Even after her re-
cord-setting performance in the 2000 Term, she actually lost
more than a tenth of her power. Second, we have confirmed a
conclusion that we reached in 1996: "Sandra Day O'Connor [is]
one of the Supreme Court's weaker Justices."" Breathless
portrayals of Justice O'Connor as the Court's most influential
member'1 2 draw no support from our quantitative analysis of
111. Id. at 98.
112. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 3,
2001, at 32.
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her performance. After seven Terms, Justice O'Connor has reg-
istered JQs in the 80s under both the naive and the sophisti-
cated indexes. Judicial greatness should be made of sterner
stuff.
3. Generalized Banzhaf Index
Our technique of inferring feasibility from the coalitions
observed in any given single Term, which is by far the most
elaborate of our indexes, performed erratically:
Table 6: Generalized Banzhaf Index, Term by Term
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 9.6 10.9 8.6 12.1 13.4 11.2 8.6 13.1 12.5
86 98 77 109 121 101 77 118 112
1995 12.0 6.8 12.0 11.5 12.6 11.5 11.0 13.6 8.9
108 61 108 104 113 104 99 123 80
1996 9.8 8.0 12.6 9.2 8.6 14.4 10.3 14.9 12.1
88 71 114 83 78 129 93 134 109
1997 9.9 12.6 13.1 5.8 10.5 14.7 8.4 11.0 14.1
90 113 118 52 94 132 75 99 127
1998 11.9 10.5 11.5 11.5 11.2 12.2 8.0 11.2 11.9
107 94 104 104 101 110 72 101 107
1999 11.6 6.1 6.7 11.6 11.6 11.0 14.0 12.8 14.6
104 55 60 104 104 99 129 115 132
2000 8.9 9.4 11.5 10.5 8.9 13.1 11.0 14.1 12.6
80 85 104 94 80 118 99 127 113
The perennial winners under this measure are Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter. All three have avoided a Term
of significant underperformance (defined as falling short of ex-
pected voting power by more than twenty percent), and all
three have enjoyed at least two Terms marked by JQs over 120.
Justice Kennedy fares noticeably worse, relative to his showing
in our simpler indexes. Finally, Justices Stevens and O'Connor
demonstrate radical shifts in power not evident from, much less
consonant with, power shifts suggested by the naive index. In
the generalized Banzhaf index, which is designed to predict
long-term coalition building ability from short-term data,
swings exceeding six percentage points separate the highest
from the lowest annual ratings for Justices Stevens and
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O'Connor.
The generalized Banzhaf index completely collapses when
computed over time:
Table 7: Generalized Banzhaf Index, Cumulative
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 9.6 10.9 8.6 12.1 13.4 11.2 8.6 13.1 12.5
86 98 77 109 121 101 77 118 112
94-95 11.5 9.9 9.9 10.6 12.4 12.1 10.2 12.6 10.8
103 89 89 95 111 109 91 113 97
94-96 11.1 9.3 10.3 11.5 11.9 12.1 11.1 12.1 10.9
100 84 93 103 107 108 100 108 98
94-97 11.2 10.2 10.2 11.1 11.8 11.8 11.1 11.4 11.4
101 91 91 99 106 106 99 103 103
94-98 11.2 10.9 10.9 11.2 11.2 11.1 11.1 11.2 11.2
101 98 98 101 101 100 100 101 101
94-99 11.2 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.0
101 99 99 99 99 101 101 101 99
94-2000 11.2 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.0
101 99 99 99 99 101 101 101 99
Over time, our method for inferring feasibility generates so
many of the mathematically possible combinations that it no
longer provides useful information. By the end of October
Term 2000, 497 of 512 combinations were deemed feasible.
Only fourteen combinations, plus the legally impossible null
set, remained out of reach. We therefore abandon the cumula-
tive form of the generalized Banzhaf index as a long-run gauge
of voting power on the Supreme Court.
B. MUSINGS ON THE MEANING OF THE MEDIAN
We now turn to Professor Lynn Baker's alternatives to our
indexes. Professor Baker's measures of voting power on the
Supreme Court differ from ours in that she believes that a me-
dian Justice for each controversy exists and can be discovered.
Her search therefore focuses on the supposed ideological pivot
of the Court. We will now present three alternative methods of
identifying the median Justice. First, we will present Professor
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Baker's "standard measure," which counts the total number of
decisions in which each Justice votes with the prevailing side.
Second, we will test Professor Baker's own alternative to her
standard measure: the "decision method" of counting the total
number of cases decided by each five-Justice coalition. Finally,
we will apply a modified median measure, which shares our
technique of counting only the number of unique coalitions,
without regard to frequency of repetition.
1. Baker's Standard Measure
Professor Baker's standard measure bears some resem-
blance to our naive index. Like our simplest measure, Profes-
sor Baker relies on plain addition: the greater the number of
relevant decisions in which a Justice's views prevail, the
greater that Justice's imputed voting power. Like our naive in-
dex, Baker's standard measure also exhibits stability Term to
Term:
Table 8: Baker's Standard Measure, Term by Term
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 11.8 9.7 11.5 10.2 12.5 11.5 9.7 11.7 11.4
106 87 104 92 113 104 87 105 102
1995 11.1 9.4 11.8 10.7 12.3 12.0 10.3 11.5 10.8
100 85 106 96 110 108 93 104 98
1996 11.8 9.9 11.5 10.4 12.8 11.3 10.9 10.9 10.5
106 89 104 94 115 102 98 98 95
1997 12.2 10.2 11.8 9.6 12.6 11.2 10.4 10.6 11.4
110 92 106 86 113 101 94 95 103
1998 11.3 9.7 12.1 11.8 12.0 11.0 10.7 10.8 10.6
101 87 109 106 108 99 96 98 95
1999 12.8 8.7 13.8 10.4 12.4 10.6 11.7 10.0 10.0
115 79 121 93 111 95 105 90 90
2000 11.8 9.5 12.6 11.1 13.0 11.1 10.9 10.3 9.7
106 85 113 100 117 100 98 93 88
Though Professor Baker's margins are narrower than ours,
her standard measure does suggest that some Justices wield
more power than others. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor and
the Chief Justice consistently exceed their expected power.
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Justice Souter hovers near par. All others lag, most notably
Justice Stevens.
The steadfast readings generated by Baker's standard
measure become even more strikingly stable when calculated
cumulatively:
Table 9: Baker's Standard Measure, Cumulative
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 11.8 9.7 11.5 10.2 12.5 11.5 9.7 11.7 11.4
106 87 104 92 113 104 87 105 102
94-95 11.5 9.6 11.7 10.5 12.4 11.7 10.0 11.6 11.1
103 86 105 94 111 106 90 104 100
94-96 11.6 9.7 11.6 10.4 12.5 11.6 10.3 11.3 10.9
104 87 105 94 113 104 93 102 98
94-97 11.7 9.8 11.7 10.2 12.5 11.5 10.3 11.1 11.0
106 88 105 92 113 103 93 100 99
94-98 11.7 9.8 11.8 10.5 12.4 11.4 10.4 11.1 11.0
105 88 106 95 112 102 94 100 99
94-99 11.8 9.7 12.0 10.5 12.4 11.3 10.6 10.9 10.8
106 87 108 95 112 102 95 99 97
94- 11.8 9.6 12.1 10.6 12.5 11.3 10.6 10.9 10.7
2000 106 87 109 95 113 101 96 98 96
Baker's standard measure is the most stable of the gauges
we apply. This is not an unequivocally positive trait; the large
number of unanimous decisions rendered by the Court domi-
nates her data. Since all Justices receive credit for participat-
ing in a unanimous decision, any variations among Justices in
Professor Baker's standard measure depend on distinctions
within non-unanimous decisions. This characteristic also ex-
plains why her standard measure produces noticeably narrower
gaps between Justices.
Throughout a study period of seven Terms, every JQ falls
within thirteen points of 100. It seems implausible that every
Justice on a Court filled with notoriously idiosyncratic person-
alities would vary from his or her expected voting power by no
more than an eighth. To be sure, Professor Baker's standard
measure does not exhibit the extreme convergence that plagues
the cumulative application of our generalized Banzhaf index.
Professor Baker's gauge suggests that the most powerful mem-
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bers of today's Court (albeit by comparatively narrow margins)
are Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist. On the other hand, her standard measure may not
reflect anything besides the propensity of a bloc dominated by
these three Justices to decide a relatively large number of
cases, often at the expense of the last-place finisher, Justice
Stevens. It reveals little if anything about the ability of indi-
vidual Justices to form coalitions with a wide range of partners.
For a look at the median Justice that even more closely re-
sembles our naive index, we now turn to Professor Baker's de-
cision method.
2. Baker's Decision Method
Professor Baker's own alternative method for discerning
the "median" Justice is a docket-sensitive variation on our na-
ive index. Like our naive index, this method relies solely on
five-Justice coalitions. Unlike us, however, Professor Baker
counts multiple instances of each coalition:
Table 10: Baker's Decision Method, Term by Term
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 13.0 10.4 12.1 7.8 15.7 10.4 7.0 13.0 10.4
117 94 110 70 141 94 63 117 94
1995 9.2 9.2 15.4 10.8 13.8 12.3 9.2 10.8 9.2
83 83 138 97 125 111 83 97 83
1996 13.6 9.1 14.5 11.8 16.4 8.2 12.7 6.4 7.3
123 82 131 106 147 74 115 57 65
1997 13.3 9.5 13.3 9.5 16.2 7.6 12.4 7.6 10.5
120 86 120 86 146 69 111 69 94
1998 11.1 9.6 14.1 12.6 14.8 8.9 11.9 9.6 7.4
100 87 127 113 133 80 107 87 67
1999 15.8 4.2 16.7 14.2 15.8 6.7 16.7 4.2 5.8
00 142 38 150 128 142 60 150 38 52
2000 12.9 7.1 15.5 13.5 15.5 7.7 12.9 7.7 7.1
116 64 139 122 139 70 116 70 64
Modifying our naive index to account for the frequency of
certain coalitions shifts a noticeable amount of power toward
the five members of the putatively conservative coalition of
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas. This consolidation of power on the right
evidently occurred through accretion rather than revolution.
Indeed, the first two Terms of the Clinton-Rehnquist Court
seemed ideologically contestable. Justice Ginsburg tied the
Chief Justice for second place during the 1994 Term, and Jus-
tice Souter registered a strong third-place finish in the 1995
Term.
October Term 1996, however, changed everything. That
Term witnessed the first above-par performances for Justices
Scalia and Thomas, who had previously failed to vote their ex-
pected weight. Since the 1996 Term, the members of the con-
servative bloc have failed to reach par only once; Justice Scalia
registered a disappointing 9.5 rating during the 1997 Term.
The contrast is stark. Since 1996 the members of the conserva-
tive crew have exceeded the 100 JQ benchmark twenty-three
times out of twenty-five, met that figure once, and failed once.
That translates to a success rate of ninety-two to ninety-six
percent. During the 1994 and 1995 Terms, the same Justices
reached the 100 JQ benchmark in merely five of ten opportuni-
ties.
The 1996 Term also marked the beginning of the liberal
wing's decline. In the 1994 Term, Justice Ginsburg tied the
Chief Justice with a 13.0 rating, good for second place behind
Justice Kennedy's 15.7 rating. Justice Souter finished a strong
third the next Term with 12.3 index points. In the 1996 Term,
however, both Justices Souter and Ginsburg plunged far be-
neath the benchmark JQ of 100. They would never regain their
earlier levels of performance. Indeed, from the 1996 Term on-
ward, no member of the Court's liberal wing has ever reached
par according to Professor Baker's decision method. In the
1999 Term, even as Justices O'Connor and Thomas tied for
first, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer turned in
appalling numbers. Their power ratings, respectively, were
4.2, 6.7, 4.2, and 5.8. In other words, these four Justices put
together captured scarcely more than a fifth of the entire
Court's voting power. Either Justice O'Connor or Justice Tho-
mas alone, with a rating of 16.7, came dangerously close to
matching the entire liberal wing.
Computing Professor Baker's decision method on a cumu-
lative basis completes the analogy with our naive index:
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Table 11: Baker's Decision Method, Cumulative
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 13.0 10.4 12.1 7.8 15.7 10.4 7.0 13.0 10.4
117 94 110 70 141 94 63 117 94
94-95 11.7 10.0 13.3 8.9 15.0 11.1 7.8 12.2 10.0
105 90 120 80 135 100 70 110 90
94-96 12.4 9.7 13.8 10.0 15.5 10.0 9.7 10.0 9.0
112 87 124 90 140 90 87 90 81
94-97 12.7 9.6 13.7 9.9 15.7 9.4 10.4 9.4 9.4
114 87 123 89 141 84 93 84 84
94-98 12.3 9.6 13.8 10.6 15.5 9.2 10.8 9.4 8.9
110 87 124 95 139 83 97 85 80
94-99 12.9 8.6 14.3 11.2 15.5 8.8 11.8 8.5 8.3
116 78 129 101 140 79 107 76 75
94- 12.9 8.3 14.5 11.7 15.6 8.6 12.0 8.3 8.1
2000 116 75 131 105 140 77 108 75 73
The impact of the Court's docket becomes strikingly evi-
dent in the cumulative application of Professor Baker's decision
method. By the end of the 2000 Term, the members of the lib-
eral coalition of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
were reduced to three-quarters of their expected voting power.
All four are now mired between 8.1 and 8.6 index points, exer-
cising on average a pallid three-quarters of their expected vot-
ing power. Justice Scalia, the weakest of the conservatives,
outvotes each of the liberals by at least three full percentage
points. Every member of the frequently encountered conserva-
tive coalition consisting of the Chief Justice and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas now enjoys more than
his or her expected share of the Court's power. Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor dominate the ratings, while the Chief Jus-
tice presents a formidable third-place profile.
The changes in this index over time also bear notice. Col-
lectively, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer exerted just
slightly more than their expected voting power after October
Term 1994. At that time, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Tho-
mas commanded an average power index near 9.0, good for a
JQ in the neighborhood of eighty. Six Terms later, Justice
Ginsburg has yielded forty-two points of JQ, while Justice
Thomas has added forty-five points. Supreme Court voting
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power really is a zero-sum game. The strength that Justices
Breyer and Stevens have lost over this period has found its way
into the power ratings of Justices Scalia and O'Connor.
No other gauge of Supreme Court behavior divides voting
power along such overtly ideological lines. We believe that Pro-
fessor Baker's decision method ultimately measures little be-
yond conservative dominance of the Court's docket since 1994
(or at least since 1996). In an era dominated by the shadow of
Bush v. Gore," 3 what started out as the Clinton-Rehnquist
Court is now more appropriately considered the Rehnquist
Court, simplicter.
3. Modified Median Measure
Focusing solely on the number of unique coalitions rather
than the number of decisions decided by each coalition comes
much closer to fulfilling the quest for the median Justice.
Unlike either of Professor Baker's measures, what we call the
modified median measure assesses each Justice's propensity to
join a winning coalition while minimizing influence from the
Court's docket:
113. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (per curiam).
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Table 12: Modified Median Measure, Term by Term
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMIK DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 12.6 9.9 10.3 9.4 13.5 12.1 7.6 13.5 11.2
113 89 93 85 121 109 69 121 101
1995 10.5 8.9 12.6 10.0 13.2 13.2 8.9 12.1 10.5
95 81 114 90 118 118 81 109 95
1996 10.9 9.9 10.3 9.4 14.4 12.4 10.4 11.9 10.4
98 89 94 85 129 111 94 107 94
1997 12.4 10.9 11.9 7.4 13.4 12.4 9.4 9.9 12.4
111 98 107 67 120 111 85 89 111
1998 10.8 10.8 11.3 12.3 10.8 11.3 9.9 11.3 11.3
98 98 102 110 98 102 89 102 102
1999 11.7 8.3 13.3 8.9 11.1 12.8 11.1 11.1 11.7
105 75 120 80 100 115 100 100 105
2000 11.3 9.1 10.2 10.8 13.6 13.1 10.2 11.4 10.2
1 102 82 92 97 123 118 92 102 92
Modifying Professor Baker's standard measure to exclude
the effects of the Court's docket shifts a noticeable amount of
power toward Justice Souter in every Term. In most Terms,
Justice Kennedy also registers respectable numbers, while
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
struggle to remain above par. Justice Thomas's ascension and
Justice Ginsburg's corresponding decline are also evident,
though less so than in our indexes:
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Table 13: Modified Median Measure, Cumulative
Term CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
1994 12.6 9.9 10.3 9.4 13.5 12.1 7.6 13.5 11.2
113 89 93 85 121 109 69 121 101
94-95 12.1 9.2 11.4 10.2 13.0 12.1 8.9 12.7 10.5
109 83 103 91 117 109 80 114 94
94-96 11.8 9.4 10.5 10.2 13.4 12.3 9.7 12.6 10.2
106 85 94 92 120 111 87 113 92
94-97 11.6 10.1 10.5 9.7 13.4 12.1 9.9 11.6 11.0
105 91 95 87 120 109 89 105 99
94-98 11.7 10.6 10.4 10.2 12.5 11.7 10.2 11.7 11.0
106 95 93 92 113 106 92 106 99
94-99 11.8 10.5 10.5 9.9 12.5 12.0 10.3 11.4 11.0
106 94 94 90 113 108 93 103 99
94- 11.5 10.5 10.3 10.1 12.4 12.1 10.5 11.4 11.2
2000 104 94 93 91 112 109 94 102 101
With one very notable exception, the cumulative table
seems to confirm the trends visible from a Term-by-Term appli-
cation of the modified median measure. Justice Kennedy, Jus-
tice Souter, and Chief Justice Rehnquist lead the Court, though
not by substantial margins. As in so many other measures,
Justice Thomas has improved over seven Terms, while Justice
Ginsburg has faded. Justice Ginsburg's fifty-two-point lead
over Justice Thomas in JQ has now shrunk to eight points. Fi-
nally, like our naive and sophisticated indexes, the cumulative
version of the modified median measure does not merely repre-
sent the average of its yearly results. Though Justice Stevens
trails Justice O'Connor in every Term, he has finished tied with
or ahead of Justice O'Connor in the cumulative modified me-
dian measure since the end of October Term 1998.
Like its close cousin, Baker's standard measure, the modi-
fied median measure exhibits a strong regression toward the
mean. At the end of seven Terms, eight of nine Justices are
clustered within a tenth of their expected voting power. The
ninth, Justice Kennedy, exceeds that margin by two points of
JQ. Within this narrow band, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Ginsburg cast slightly
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weightier votes than do their colleagues. Only a few paces be-
hind this pack, Justice Breyer has straddled par as tightly as
anyone plausibly can. He has not deviated more than a single
point from the 100 JQ benchmark since the 1997 Term.
The overwhelming trend in this table nevertheless remains
that of regression toward the mean. With the trivial exception
of Justice O'Connor, whose final index of 10.3 matches her
power rating after October Term 1994, the ratings for every
Justice crept over time toward the benchmarks of 11.1 index
points and 100 in JQ.
Justice O'Connor's performance in the modified median
measure, however, is very significant in distinguishing this in-
dex from Baker's standard measure. For the sake of conven-
ience, we reproduce the "bottom line" from both indexes-that
is, their cumulative results after seven Terms:
Table 14: Baker's Standard Measure Versus Modified Median
Measure; Cumulative Results, 1994-2000 Terms
Index CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
Baker 11.8 9.6 12.1 10.6 12.5 11.3 10.6 10.9 10.7
standard 106 87 109 95 113 101 96 98 96
Modified 11.5 10.5 10.3 10.1 12.4 12.1 10.5 11.4 11.2
median ,104 ,94 ,93 ,91 ,112 ,109 ,94 ,102 ,101
Recall that the difference between Baker's standard meas-
ure and the modified median measure is simply the latter's ex-
clusion of multiple cases decided by the same coalition. The
two likeliest margins in the Supreme Court's decisions, perhaps
paradoxically, are 9-0 and 5-4.114 Unanimous decisions say
nothing about relative differences in voting power among the
Justices. Even for scholars who share Professor Baker's as-
sumption that the Justices vote along a single ideological di-
mension, 115 the inclusion of unanimous decisions undermines
114. See Edelman & Sherry, supra note 35, at 1226 & n.3 (ranking
unanimous decisions most frequent in the Court's docket and 5-4 decisions
second in frequency).
115. See Richard B. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1998
Term, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423, 423-24 (2000) (conducting an annual study
"to determine whether individual Justices and the Court as a whole are voting
more 'conservatively,' more 'liberally,' or about the same as compared with past
Terms").
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confidence in a quantitative analysis of Supreme Court behav-
ior. 116 Five-Justice majorities, by contrast, say quite a bit; Pro-
fessor Baker merely quibbles with us over the weight to accord
those decisions. All this is a convoluted way of saying that
much, perhaps most, of the docket bias in Baker's standard
measure rests in the multiple crediting of five-Justice majori-
ties that decide many cases. That much is clear from the pro-
nounced ideological profile of Baker's decision method. In other
words, the modified median measure is in practical terms (if
not mathematically precise terms) the equivalent of Baker's
standard measure minus much of the docket bias embodied in
Baker's decision method.
Given their close kinship, it comes as no surprise that
these indexes generate such similar results. After seven
Terms, Baker's standard measure and the modified median
measure reach almost identical conclusions. Eight of nine Jus-
tices come within ten points of JQ in the two indexes.
The exception, of course, is Sandra Day O'Connor. In the
transition from Baker's standard measure to the modified me-
dian measure, Justice O'Connor drops nearly two points of
power, or sixteen points of JQ. She drops from the position of
First Runner-Up in Baker's standard measure to eighth place
in the modified median measure. Every other member of the
contemporary Court's celebrated conservative coalition loses
some power, but Justice O'Connor is alone in suffering power
losses of this magnitude. In the modified median measure vis-
&-vis Baker's standard measure, the losses in JQ for Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas re-
spectively are two, four, one, and two. Those losses account for
a bare third of the JQ gains realized by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer: seven, eight, four, and five. The
rest of the difference comes at Justice O'Connor's expense.
In short, Justice O'Connor, more than any other Justice,
has been drawing much of her apparent power from the content
of the Court's docket. Were the Supreme Court presented with
a different set of legal issues, one should expect Justice
O'Connor to be significantly less supple than any of her col-
leagues in the Court's moderate-to-conservative wing. For us,
the modified median measure has the happy coincidence of con-
firming the naive and sophisticated indexes' conclusion that
Justice O'Connor is a relatively weak member of the Supreme
116. See id. at 429 (conceding that such an "analytical scheme is not
perfect").
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Court.
For methodological purposes, the contrast between these
indexes suggests that the modified median measure should be
favored over Baker's standard measure. The inclusion of so
many unanimous decisions dilutes the value of Baker's stan-
dard measure. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's performance
demonstrates how the pronounced bias in the Court's docket
overwhelms and ultimately discredits Baker's decision method.
Insofar as the modified median measure represents the best of
Baker's standard measure, stripped of the baneful influence of
her decision method, it outperforms those other means of iden-
tifying the Supreme Court's median Justice.
C. HANDICAPPING THE POWER PAGEANT: A HALFTIME REPORT
Whether derived from Banzhafs index of voting power or
some sort of quest for the "median Justice," the measures we
have studied reach some degree of agreement. Justices Ken-
nedy and Souter, followed somewhat remotely by the Chief Jus-
tice, form the Court's elite:
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Table 15: Power Pageant Finalists-A Summary
Rank Naive Sophist- Baker's Baker's Modified
index icated standard decision median
index measure method measure
1st: Most Kennedy Souter Kennedy Kennedy Kennedy
Dangerous 14.1 126 18.8 169 12.5 113 15.6 140 12.4 112
Justice
2d: First Souter Kennedy O'Connor O'Connor Souter
Runner-Up 12.4 112 14.1 127 12.1 109 14.5 131 12.1 109
Rehnquist
11.9 107
3-way tie:
Stevens
Ginsburg
Breyer
11.4 102
4-way tie:
Rehnquist
Scalia
Thomas
Breyer
10.6 95
Rehnquist
11.8 106
Rehnquist
12.9 116
Rehnquist
11.5 104
Souter Thomas Ginsburg
11.3 101 12.0 108 11.4 102
Ginsburg Scalia Breyer
10.9 98 11.7 105 11.2 101
Breyer
10.7 96
+ 4 4
2-way tie:
O'Connor
Thomas
9.7 88
O'Connor
9.4 85
Ginsburg
8.2 74
Thomas
10.6 96
Scalia
10.6 95
Souter
8.6 77
2-way tie:
Ginsburg
Stevens
8.3 75
2-way tie:
Stevens
Thomas
10.5 94
O'Connor
10.3 93
3d: Mr. or
Ms. Con-
geniality
9t Scalia Stevens Stevens Breyer Scalia
1 8.1 73 7.1 64 9.6 87 8.1 73 10.1 91
5Lh
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Presenting the final results of all five measures enables us
to see the Power Pageant from another perspective:
Table 16: Another View of the Power Pageant
Index CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
Naive 11.9 11.4 9.7 8.1 14.1 12.4 9.7 11.4 11.4
107 102 88 73 126 112 88 102 102
Sophist- 10.6 7.1 9.4 10.6 14.1 18.8 10.6 8.2 10.6
icated 95 64 85 95 127 169 95 74 95
Baker 11.8 9.6 12.1 10.6 12.5 11.3 10.6 10.9 10.7
standard 106 87 109 95 113 101 96 98 96
Baker 12.9 8.3 14.5 11.7 15.6 8.6 12.0 8.3 8.1
decision 116 75 131 105 140 77 108 75 73
Modified 11.5 10.5 10.3 10.1 12.4 12.1 10.5 11.4 11.2
median 104 94 93 91 112 109 94 102 101
Notably, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist are the only three contestants who achieved top-
three finishes in at least three out of five indexes. These three
are also the only Justices to attract more than their expected
share of power-that is, power indexes greater than or equal to
11.1 and JQs greater than or equal to 100-in at least four
measures. We believe that these three jurists, and only these
three, qualify as finalists in the Power Pageant of the Justices.
Our indexes and Professor Baker's differ radically on the
question of Sandra Day O'Connor. We simply do not share Pro-
fessor Baker's enthusiasm for Justice O'Connor. Justice
O'Connor fares no better than seventh in our measures, sub-
stantially below the benchmark for an average Justice. She ex-
cels, however, in Professor Baker's standard and decision
measures, finishing a strong second in these indexes. As we
have noted, both of these indexes heavily reflect the content of
the Court's docket. The modified median measure, which re-
sembles our indexes in counting each unique coalition only once
but is in all other respects the methodological cousin of Profes-
sor Baker's measures, places Justice O'Connor in eighth place.
Professor Baker's decision method stands out among these
indexes. We have already noted how cleanly it segregates the
Justices by ideology. The five most conservative members of
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the Court all wield more than their expected share of power,
while the four most liberal Justices are mired within two points
of seventy-five in JQ.
If this index is set aside, the other power rating systems
reach a rough consensus on Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. With minor variations among the indexes, the three
most junior Justices occupy the middle of the power ratings.
Thanks to her strong fourth place finishes in our naive index
and in the modified median measure, Justice Ginsburg seems
marginally stronger than Justice Breyer. He in turn outranks
Justice Thomas. The exception to this trend is the sophisti-
cated index, which rates Justice Ginsburg a lowly eighth.
These figures, however, obscure movement within the rat-
ings over the course of seven Terms. Justice Ginsburg finished
out of the money in all indexes despite winning the title of Most
Dangerous Justice for the 1995 Term. Despite his abysmal
start, Justice Thomas gained strength in every measure and
came within a hair of securing no less than nine-tenths of his
expected voting power in every index.
Justices Scalia and Stevens appear to be the Court's weak-
est Justices. Each scores a distant last in one of our indexes.
Though the margins are narrower, the two median Justice
measures not wholly distorted by the Court's docket-namely,
Baker's standard measure and the modified median measure-
rate Justices Stevens and Scalia no higher than sixth.
The indexes themselves do not survive the Power Pageant
altogether unscathed. Our generalized Banzhaf index has
proved useless as a long-run measure of voting power. It gen-
erates so much information that it cannot identify differences
in voting power on a Court whose Justices are ideologically
riven and far from equal in their coalition-building aptitudes.
Professor Baker's decision method is so transparently depend-
ent on the Court's docket that its results can scarcely be
trusted. Among the remaining measures designed to find the
median Justice, we prefer the modified median measure be-
cause it, unlike Baker's standard measure, avoids the decision
method's fatal technique of counting multiple instances of each
observed coalition.
But this game continues. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Souter are awaiting the announcement of
the Most Dangerous Justice. Reluctant to conclude the Power
Pageant without consulting some non-quantitative measures of
relative voting strength, we now turn to the set of indirect
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measures that we consulted in our original 1996 study.
D. INDIRECT MEASURES OF VOTING POWER
Relying exclusively on the Harvard Law Review's annual
survey of the Supreme Court, we will reprise three of the indi-
rect measures of voting power that we considered in The Most
Dangerous Justice. In turn we will count the number of 5-4
cases decided by particular coalitions, consider the number and
significance of 5-4 opinions written by each Justice, and exam-
ine overall voting alignments among the Justices. The most re-
cent Harvard Law Review survey available to us covered the
1999 Term. As this article went to press, the Harvard Law Re-
view had yet to analyze the 2000 Term. Though we will not at-
tempt to duplicate Harvard's calculation of overall voting
alignments, we will rely on a leading journalist's overview of
the 2000 Term to emulate Harvard's survey of putatively sig-
nificant cases. In her annual Supreme Court roundup for the
New York Times, 117 Linda Greenhouse analyzed twenty-six
cases, fifteen of which would fit Harvard's definition of a 5-4
margin.11 8 We found an additional twelve cases that, in our
judgment, would satisfy Harvard's definition of a 5-4 deci-
sion.
11 9
117. Linda Greenhouse, In Year of Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did
Much Other Work, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2,2001, at A12.
118. The fifteen cases decided by a 5-4 margin in the Greenhouse survey
were Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001) (Breyer, J.); Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001) (Kennedy, J.); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121
S. Ct. 2404 (2001) (O'Connor, J.); FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Commission, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) (Souter, J.); INS v. Saint Cyr,
121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001) (Stevens, J.); Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001)
(Kennedy, J.); Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001) (Scalia, J.);
Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001) (Scalia, J.); Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001) (Souter, J.); Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452
(2001) (Breyer, J.); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001)
(Kennedy, J.); Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001)
(Kennedy, J.); Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S.
Ct. 955 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J.); Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J.); Bush v. Gore, 121 S.
Ct. 525 (2000) (per curiam).
119. See Tyler v. Cain, 121 S. Ct. 2478 (2001) (Thomas, J.); Calcano-Martinez
v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2268 (2001) (Stevens, J.); Idaho v. United States, 121 S. Ct.
2135 (2001) (Souter, J.); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1861
(2001) (Scalia, J.); Buckhannon Bd. & Home, Inc., v. W. Va. Dep't of Health &
Human Res., 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J.); Rogers v. Tennessee, 121
S. Ct. 1693 (2001) (O'Connor, J.); Daniels v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 1578
(2001) (O'Connor, J.); Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Cross, 121 S. Ct.
1567 (2001) (O'Connor, J.); Texas v. Cobb, 121 S. Ct. 1335 (2001) (Rehnquist,
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1. Number of Cases Decided by Particular Coalitions
Although all of our measures of voting power ignore the
frequency with which certain groups of Justices align, we have
acknowledged that "the number of cases decided by particular
coalitions" may "rank high in any pragmatic assessment of the
Court."'120 The number of times a Justice prevails over the
course of a Term or of several Terms is the cornerstone of Pro-
fessor Baker's standard measure. 121 In fact, she goes so far as
to prescribe the strategy of "join[ing] the winning coalition
more often than the other Power Pageant contestants" as "the
route to victory."122 By contrast, we believe that "the habit of
voting with the majority does not, standing alone, determine a
Justice's influence." 123 We therefore prefer to think of the fre-
quency of victory as an informal "plus factor."
124
Apart from any considerations of accuracy, this measure
does reveal some differences among the Justices. Relying ex-
clusively on the Harvard Law Review's tally of 5-4 decisions
from the 1994 Term to the 1999 Term and on our own applica-
tion of Harvard's criteria to the 2000 Term, we discovered a
lopsided distribution of decisions among thirty five-Justice coa-
litions:
125
C.J.); Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 121 S. Ct. 924
(2001) (Souter, J.); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 121 S. Ct. 513 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J.); Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512 (2000) (per curiam).
In her tally of 5-4 decisions, Greenhouse reported twenty-six rather
than twenty-seven. Greenhouse, supra note 117, at A12. In all likelihood, the
decision she would exclude is the stay decision in Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512
(2000), which consisted of a minimalist per curiam opinion, a full concurrence
by Justice Scalia, and a full dissent by Justice Stevens for himself and Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The alignment of this case was repeated in a
key portion of the decision on the merits in Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000),
as well as thirteen other cases decided during October Term 2000. The inclu-
sion vel non of the stay decision has minimal impact on our overall analysis.
120. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 86-87.
121. See Baker, supra note 2, at 202.
122. Id. at 208.
123. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 221.
124. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 86.
125. For similar assessments of the Court's recent 5-4 decisions, see Linda
Greenhouse, Divided They Stand: The High Court and the Triumph of Discord,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 4, at 1; Jonathan Ringel, What the High Court Says
When It Votes 5-4, LEGAL TIiES, Dec. 18, 2000, at 14.
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Table 17: Number of Cases Decided by Specific Five-Justice
Coalitions; 5-4 Decisions Only, 1994-2000 Terms
Five-Justice coalitions Cases decided
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas 58
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 15
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 13
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg 3
Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas 2
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer 2
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas 2
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer 2
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer 2
Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg 2
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter 1
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg 1
Rebnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer 1
Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer 1
Rehnquist, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, Breyer 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg 1
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 1
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer 1
Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg 1
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas 1
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg 1
Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Breyer 1
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg 1
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 1
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer 1
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer 1
The conservative bloc of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
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tices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas rendered nearly
half of the Court's 121 five-to-four decisions during these seven
Terms. This quintet has decided so many prominent cases, in-
cluding Bush v. Gore,126 that it has acquired its own social
meaning. 127 Recent work by Brian Lowe allows a more detailed
look at this coalition. The interactive program at Lowe's web-
site128 uses our data to measure the power of each Justice
within a particular coalition. For a fixed coalition of Justices,
Lowe defines the power of a Justice within that coalition to be
the number of alliances he or she can form with Justices out-
side that coalition. The program then computes the relative
power of Justices within that coalition. Lowe's methodology
blends aspects of our approach and of Professor Baker's. Like
us, Lowe tries to measure the propensity of each Justice to form
coalitions with different colleagues. Like Professor Baker, he
counts multiple instances of each coalition. This trait enables
his program to report the most common coalition containing
any particular combination of Justices.
Lowe's work also supports our hypothesis that Justice
O'Connor draws more of her power than does any other Justice
strictly from the distribution of cases in the Court's docket.
Lowe's results for the conservative bloc show that Justice
O'Connor holds thirty-one percent of the power within this coa-
lition, followed in order by Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia,
Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist with twenty-four,
twenty, seventeen, and eight percent respectively. The domi-
nance of the conservative bloc, combined with Justice
O'Connor's prominence within that coalition, goes a long way
toward explaining the popular perception that Justice
O'Connor is extremely powerful.
Across the entire spectrum of 5-4 decisions, certain coali-
tions are far likelier to emerge. The three most frequently ob-
served coalitions-the conservative bloc and two alliances con-
sisting of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer plus
either Justice O'Connor or Justice Kennedy-accounted for
more than two-thirds of the Court's single-vote decisions. No
other coalition decided more than three cases, and twenty of
thirty distinct five-Justice blocs decided a single case.
126. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (per curiam).
127. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CM. L. REV. 943 (1995).
128. Brian Lowe, Most Powerful Justice, at http'//law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/
edelman/php_.mpj (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
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Given the prominence of their alliance in the Court's recent
history, the members of the conservative bloc participated in
more winning coalitions than did their comparatively liberal
colleagues:
Table 18: Number of Times Each Justice Prevailed in 5-4
Decisions
Justice Number of cases Winning percentage
Kennedy 94 77.7%
O'Connor 90 74.4%
Rehnquist 78 64.5%
Thomas 78 64.5%
Scalia 75 62.0%
Souter 49 40.5%
Stevens 47 38.8%
Ginsburg 47 38.8%
Breyer 45 37.2%
No Justice outside the conservative bloc tasted victory in a
majority of the Court's 5-4 decisions. Justice Scalia, who en-
joyed fewer wins than any other member of the conservative
bloc, was more than half again as likely as Justice Souter to
prevail in a 5-4 situation.
Within the conservative bloc, two members stand out. Jus-
tices O'Connor and Kennedy were significantly more likely
than Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, or Justice Thomas
to participate in a winning five-Justice coalition. The disparity
is easily explained. Justice O'Connor abandoned the conserva-
tive bloc fifteen times over seven Terms to form winning alli-
ances with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Justice Kennedy did so thirteen times over the same span. We
therefore award the first tiebreaker to Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy.
2. Number and Significance of 5-4 Opinions Written by
Individual Justices
The number and putative importance of opinions written in
5-4 cases may also shed some light on individual Justices' rela-
180 [Vol. 86:131
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tive voting power.129 We refer again to the Harvard Law Re-
view's statistical analyses of the Supreme Court. In its annual
review of the previous Term, Harvard not only counts 5-4 deci-
sions but also compiles an informal, highly subjective list of
"greatest hits."130 By tradition, a professional author writes a
comment on the previous Term's most significant decision or
cluster of decisions. The student editors then write brief notes
on roughly twenty-five other decisions. With remarkable con-
sistency over time, Harvard devotes extended commentary,
whether written by a professional or a student, to slightly more
than half of the cases it identifies as having been decided by a
5-4 margin. The Greenhouse survey of the 2000 Term shares a
practically identical profile: twenty-six cases worthy of analy-
sis, among them fifteen of the twenty-seven cases decided by a
5-4 margin.
The following table reports authorship of 5-4 decisions by
individual Justices. The first number in each cell indicates the
number of five-Justice majority opinions by a Justice in a par-
ticular Term. The second number refers to the number of ma-
jority opinions within the subset of 5-4 cases that merited ei-
ther a professional comment or a student case note in the
Harvard Law Review's survey of Supreme Court Terms 1994
through 1999 or a mention in Linda Greenhouse's roundup of
the 2000 Term. The greater the second number relative to the
first, the greater the likelihood that the Justice in question has
written a 5-4 decision in a noteworthy case:
129. See Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 88-89.
130. See generally Saul Brenner, Measuring the Importance of Supreme
Court Decisions, 90 LAW LIBR. J. 183 (1998) (concluding that there are no
uniformly reliable measures of the importance of Supreme Court decisions).
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Table 19: Authorship of 5-4 Decisions, Including "Significant"
Decisions
Term 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
CJ 3/3 4/2 2/1 1/0 1/1 5/3 5/2 21/12
57%
JPS 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/1 1/0 2/1 2/1 12/7
58%
Soc 2/2 0/0 2/1 3/3 3/3 2/2 4/1 16/12
75%
AS 0/0 1/0 2/1 1/0 2/2 1/1 3/2 10/6
60%
AMK 5/3 0/0 4/1 3/3 3/3 2/0 4/4 21/14
67%
DHS 1/0 0/0 3/1 0/0 2/0 0/0 4/2 10/3
30%
CT 0/0 0/0 2/1 3/1 1/0 3/0 1/0 10/2
20%
RBG 3/1 2/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 5/2
40%
SGB 0/0 0/0 1/1 3/2 2/0 3/2 2/2 11/7
64%
Per 0/0 2/0 0/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 2/1 5/1
Curiam 20%
Total 16/11 11/5 18/9 15/10 16/9 18/9 27/15 121/68
56%
This table reflects several striking patterns. Four Jus-
tices-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
and Kennedy-account for authorship of seventy of the 121
one-vote decisions at issue (57.9%), including forty-five of the
sixty-eight most significant (66.2%). Put somewhat differently,
four of the Court's five most senior members wrote nearly
three-fifths of the Court's 5-4 decisions and nearly two-thirds of
the significant cases decided by a 5-4 vote. By contrast, the
four most junior Justices-Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer-
produced a relatively modest total of thirty-six majority opin-
ions in 5-4 cases (29.8%), including an even smaller share (four-
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teen opinions, or 20.6%) of significant 5-4 cases. At an average
of nine opinions, including 3.5 opinions in significant cases, the
most junior Justices more closely resemble "Per Curiam, J.,"
than they resemble Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, or
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
The stark contrast between the Court's senior and junior
members highlights the power of assignment. "The significance
of opinion assignments cannot be overstated," 131 for "the power
to select the author" of an opinion equals "the power to deter-
mine the general direction of the opinion." 132 The senior Jus-
tice in a winning coalition frequently keeps control of an impor-
tant case in order to shape the lead opinion.133 The preferred
strategy shifts when the senior member of a coalition chooses to
assign rather than keep an opinion. Chief Justices over time
have "dramatically over-assign[ed] to those ideologically close
to them and under-assign[ed] to those furthest from them."
134
In other cases, however, assignments are designed to prevent
the weakest member of a fragile majority from defecting. 135
Under these circumstances, Justices closer in ideology to the
dissent tend to collect the lion's share of opinion assign-
ments. 1
36
Power over opinion assignments varies strictly according to
seniority. If all coalitions are equally likely, without regard to
coalitional dynamics or the Court's docket, then mathematics
alone dictates the probability that a Justice will assign an opin-
ion. By definition the four most junior Justices have no chance
131. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 99. See generally Forrest Maltzman
& Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the
Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421 (1996).
132. WOODWARD & AIRMSTRONG, supra note 65, at 65.
133. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE ATITrUDINAL MODEL 271-72 (1993).
134. Id. at 268; see also LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 110-12 (1997). See generally Eugenia F. Toma, A Contractual Model
of the Voting Behavior of the Supreme Court: The Role of the Chief Justice, 16
INVL REV. L. & ECON. 433 (1996).
135. See, e.g., DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAE, SUPREME COURT
DECISION MAKING 172-92 (1976); Cross, supra note 15, at 517 & n.27; Sue
Davis, Power on the Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist's Opinion Assignments, 74
JUDICATURE 66, 67-68 (1990); William P. McLauchlan, Ideology and Conflict in
Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 1946-1962, 25 W. POL. Q. 16, 16-17 (1972).
136. See Saul Brenner, The Shapley-Shubik Power Index and the Supreme
Court: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 19 JURIMETRICS J. 167, 169 n.8 (1978);
David W. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority Opinion
Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 652, 679
(1972).
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of assigning an opinion. Among the five most senior Justices,
the theoretical probability of assigning an opinion falls sharply
as seniority diminishes. The following table describes the dis-
tribution of power over opinion assignments according to the
coalition size:
137
137. To see how the numbers in Table 20 are computed, consider the example
of Justice O'Connor. For her to assign an opinion in a 5-4 decision, two
conditions must prevail. First, she must vote on the winning side. Second, the
other Justices in the majority cannot include either Chief Justice Rehnquist or
Justice Stevens, who are senior to her and would assert the assignment privilege
ahead of her. Therefore, the other members of the majority must be drawn from
the set of six Justices junior to Justice O'Connor-namely, Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. In other words, the number of
5-4 decisions in which Justice O'Connor assigns the opinion is equal to the
number of combinations of exactly four Justices drawn from the six-member set
consisting of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Recall that the formula for determining the number of combinations of exactly
c Justices on a Court of n Justices is n! / (c! - (n - c)!). See supra note 68. As
the previous discussion reveals, the relevant rump portion of a Court for pur-
poses of determining the instances in which a Justice would assign the opinion
is the portion of the Court junior to the assigning Justice. That number is
merely n minus r, where r represents the rank of the assigning Justice on a
scale where the Chief Justice holds rank 1. If m represents the exact size of
the winning coalition in question, an assigning Justice must join with a coali-
tion of exactly m minus 1 colleagues, all of whom are junior to him or her. In
other words, we must solve for the number of coalitions that have m minus 1
members on a rump Court of n minus r members. Substituting (n - r) for n
and (m - 1) for c yields the following formula:
(n- r)!
(m - 1)! (n - r - m + 1)!
We can now return to our original example. The number of times Justice
O'Connor, ranked third on a Court of nine Justices, would assign the opinion
within a prevailing coalition of five Justices is equal to (9 - 3)!/ ((5 - 1)!
(9 - 3 - 5 + 1)!), or 6! / (4! • 2!), which equals 15.
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Table 20: Probability of Assigning a Majority Opinion
Justice 5-4 6-3 7-2 8-1 9-0 Total %
CJ 70 56 28 8 1 163 63.7
JPS 35 21 7 1 0 64 25.0
Soc 15 6 1 0 0 22 8.6
AS 5 1 0 0 0 6 2.3
AMK 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.4
Total 126 84 36 9 1 256 100.0
Together, the Chief Justice and the senior Associate Jus-
tice hold nearly nine-tenths of the Court's theoretical "assign-
ing power." Within the subset of 126 possible five-Justice com-
binations, these two members of the Court enjoy a less
commanding but nevertheless impressive five-sixths of the
theoretical power to assign (105 of 126 combinations).
What we have is not mere hypothesis however, but the ac-
tual record of 5-4 decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
from October Term 1994 to October Term 2000. Chief Justice
Rehnquist led the winning side in seventy-eight of those 121
decisions. Of the remaining forty-three decisions, Justice Ste-
vens was the most senior member of the winning coalition in
forty-one; Justices O'Connor and Scalia led the victorious bloc
exactly once apiece. We can now compare the Court's theoreti-
cal "assigning power" with the cases it actually decided from
the 1994 Term through the 2000 Term:
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Table 21: Hypothetical Versus Actual "Assigning Power" in 5-4
Cases
Justice Hypothetical Hypothetical Actual cases Actual assigning
combina- assigning decided, OT power in 5-4
tions power '94 through cases
OT '99
Rehnquist 70 55.6% 78 64.5%
Stevens 35 27.8% 41 33.9%
O'Connor 15 11.9% 1 0.8%
Scalia 5 4.0% 1 0.8%
Kennedy 1 0.8% 0 0.0%
From the 1994 Term through the 2000 Term, 56.2% of 5-4
decisions were considered significant. For every nine opinions
written in a 5-4 setting, a Justice should expect five to decide a
significant case. The five most senior Justices met or exceeded
this standard; their four junior colleagues, except Justice
Breyer, fell significantly short of the five-ninths benchmark.
But the relevant boundary is not the one that marks the theo-
retical threshold of power to assign an opinion. It is the line
between Justices Stevens and O'Connor. Justice Stevens, as
senior Associate Justice, should expect to wield half as much
assignment power as the Chief Justice. Justice Stevens in fact
outperforms this expectation by a narrow margin. By contrast,
Justices O'Connor and Scalia have attained a negligible share
of the Court's collective power over opinion assignments. In the
lone five-Justice majority that she headed during this seven-
Term stretch, Justice O'Connor assigned Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities, Inc.138 to Justice Ginsburg during the 1995
Term. (Coincidentally, Justice Ginsburg has not written an-
other opinion for the Court in a 5-4 case since Gasperini.) Jus-
tice Scalia, perhaps aware of the precious nature of the oppor-
tunity, assigned himself the majority opinion in Kyllo v. United
States.39
In 1996 we speculated that seniority correlated negatively
with voting power. We hypothesized that the Chief Justice and
138. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
139. 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
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the senior Associate Justice, who "hold a virtual monopoly on
opinion assignments,"140 would tend to favor their raw "agenda-
setting power" over the more arduous process of acquiring in-
fluence as "swing voters." 141 By contrast, we thought that "jun-
ior Associate Justices, having little or no agenda-setting
power," would "maximiz[e] their influence" by "aligning their
political preferences with the Court's ideological center of grav-
ity and... developing a supple approach to forming coali-
tions."
142
What we have observed since 1996 forces us to rethink the
relationship between seniority and power. Given the distribu-
tion of cases on today's Court, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
have practically no power to assign opinions. Mathematics
gives Justice O'Connor nearly one-eighth of the Court's power
to assign 5-4 cases; politics eliminates all but a sliver of that
power. The Chief Justice and Justice Stevens share almost all
of the assignment power, and both have not hesitated to write
the lion's share of opinions in important cases decided by a one-
vote margin. These senior members of the Court dominated
the 5-4 blockbusters rated by Harvard as the most significant
of the 1994 1995, and 1999 Terms: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton,143 Seminole Tribe v. Florida,1"4 and United States v.
Morrison.
145
But Justices O'Connor and Kennedy also write for five-
Justice coalitions, including some of the Court's biggest deci-
sions. If anything, they outperform the Court's most senior
members. In particular, Justice O'Connor's apparent propen-
sity to write important 5-4 opinions is nothing short of aston-
140. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 100.
141. Id. at 101.
142. Id.
143. 513 U.S. 779 (1995) (Stevens, J.); see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Comment: Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1995). Justice Stevens also
wrote what Harvard Law Review rated as the most important case of the 1998
Term, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). See Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme
Court, 1998 Term-Comment: Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present?,
113 HARV. L. REV. 110 (1999).
144. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.); see Henry Paul Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Comment: The Sovereign Immunity "Exception,"
110 HARV. L. REv. 102 (1996).
145. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.); see Catharine A. MacKinnon, The
Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Comment: Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United
States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000).
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ishing. Twelve of her sixteen opinions in this category since
1994 have merited full analysis in the annual Harvard survey
or a mention in Linda Greenhouse's review of the 2000 Term.
For his part, Justice Kennedy has written two of the cases that
merited professional commentary in the Harvard Law Review's
annual Supreme Court issue. 146 To repeat: Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy are indistinguishable from all other Justices who
rank behind Justice Stevens. They must be doing something
different. Edge to Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, plus credit
ex officio to Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens for as-
signing themselves the Court's most prominent opinions.
Beyond seniority, several other patterns bear noting. De-
spite a strong 2000 Term, 147 Justice Scalia remains curiously
weak on this informal measure of power. Each of the Justices
immediately before and after him in seniority, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, writes two to three times as many 5-4
opinions, including 5-4 opinions in putatively significant cases.
Among the junior Justices, Justices Thomas and Breyer have
surged in recent years, having composed all of their combined
twenty-one opinions in 5-4 cases since October Term 1996 and
eighteen of twenty-one since the 1997 Term.
At the other extreme, Justice Ginsburg has been shut out
altogether of the Court's 5-4 derby since the end of the 1995
Term. Since October 1996, Justice Ginsburg has lagged behind
even Per Curiam, J. It is as if Justice Ginsburg exhausted her
powers of persuasion after throttling the Virginia Military In-
stitute's all-male admissions policy in her most celebrated per-
formance. 148 Lest anonymity fail to get its due, the shadowy
Per Curiam has written not only Bush v. Gore,149 perhaps the
most notorious 5-4 decision in recent memory, but also Buckley
146. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme
Court, 1996 Term-Comment: Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City
of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997); Frederick Schauer, The
Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Comment: Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998). Neither of these cases was decided by
a 5-4 margin. Professor Schauer's comment treated Forbes and NEA v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569 (1998) (O'Connor, J.), as the most important decisions of the 1997
Term.
147. During the 2000 Term, Justice Scalia wrote putatively significant
opinions in Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001), and Alexander v.
Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001). He also wrote for a five-Justice coalition in
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1861 (2001).
148. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
149. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (per curiam).
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v. Valeo, 150 the powerhouse decision written one generation ago
that arguably foreordained the bitter resolution of the 2000
election.
3. Compatibility Measured Indirectly Through Voting
Alignments
Finally, overall voting alignments provide an indirect way
of measuring each Justice's ideological flexibility. A Justice
who can ally himself or herself with a relatively large range of
colleagues will join more "winning coalitions" and thereby in-
crease his or her opportunities "to cast decisive, lawmaking
votes."'5 ' The following table is derived from the Harvard Law
Review's statistical retrospective on the Supreme Court during
the 1990s: 152
150. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
151. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 90.
152. See 1999 Harvard Survey, supra note 59, at 403-04.
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Table 22: Voting Alignments, 1994-1999 Terms
OT 94-99 CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
CJ 94 50.6 76.7 80.0 83.7 68.6 81.4 67.1 67.1
CJ 95 49.4 79.7 82.3 78.5 67.1 82.1 65.8 58.2
CJ 96 53.5 78.8 81.4 84.9 69.8 81.4 67.4 60.5
CJ 97 62.4 84.8 74.2 89.2 73.1 77.4 74.2 73.1
CJ 98 39.5 82.5 81.5 81.5 59.3 87.7 51.9 56.3
CJ 99 48.1 92.2 74.0 85.7 57.1 76.6 59.7 66.2
JPS 94 50.6 55.3 45.2 61.2 69.4 42.4 75.0 70.7
JPS 95 49.4 59.7 45.5 64.9 70.1 44.7 72.7 74.0
JPS 96 53.5 55.3 44.2 61.6 73.3 44.2 79.1 77.9
JPS 97 62.4 62.0 48.4 65.6 74.3 54.8 77.4 76.3
JPS 98 39.5 46.3 44.4 46.9 67.9 37.0 74.1 70.0
JPS 99 48.1 51.9 41.6 50.6 84.4 49.4 85.7 76.6
SOC 94 76.7 55.3 68.2 75.6 76.7 67.4 64.7 74.4
Soc 95 79.7 59.7 72.2 78.5 78.5 71.8 68.4 74.7
SOC 96 78.8 55.3 78.8 80.0 70.6 80.0 69.4 67.1
SOC 97 84.8 62.0 72.8 85.9 72.8 78.3 65.2 75.0
SOC 98 82.5 46.3 77.5 80.0 68.8 75.0 62.5 68.4
Soc 99 92.2 51.9 67.5 81.8 63.6 74.0 66.2 72.7
AS 94 80.0 45.2 68.2 75.3 60.0 88.2 59.5 59.3
AS 95 82.3 45.5 72.2 73.4 60.8 87.2 58.2 54.4
AS 96 81.4 44.2 78.8 79.1 61.6 97.7 58.1 53.5
AS 97 74.2 48.4 72.8 68.8 62.4 87.1 58.1 57.0
AS 98 81.5 44.4 77.5 72.8 60.5 84.0 53.1 50.0
AS 99 74.0 41.6 67.5 71.4 46.8 89.6 45.5 53.2
AMK 94 83.7 61.2 75.6 75.3 73.3 73.3 76.5 72.0
AMK 95 78.5 64.9 78.5 73.4 74.7 69.2 75.9 68.4
AMK 96 84.9 61.6 80.0 79.1 72.1 79.1 67.4 65.1
AMK 97 89.2 65.6 85.9 68.8 75.3 76.3 74.2 78.5
AMK 98 81.5 46.9 80.0 72.8 63.0 72.8 61.7 60.0
AMK 99 85.7 50.6 81.8 71.4 54.5 75.3 55.8 59.7
DHS 94 68.6 69.4 76.7 60.0 73.3 55.8 80.0 82.9
DHS 95 67.1 70.1 78.5 60.8 74.7 57.7 83.5 88.6
DHS 96 69.8 73.3 70.6 61.6 72.1 61.6 79.1 76.7
DHS 97 73.1 74.3 72.8 62.4 75.3 62.4 86.0 83.9
DHS 98 59.3 67.9 68.8 60.5 63.0 55.6 84.0 78.8
DHS 99 57.1 84.4 63.6 46.8 54.5 54.5 88.3 81.8
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OT 94-99 CJ JPS SOC AS AMK DHS CT RBG SGB
CT 94 81.4 42.4 67.4 88.2 73.3 55.8 54.1 58.5
CT 95 82.1 44.7 71.8 87.2 69.2 57.7 55.1 48.7
CT 96 81.4 44.2 80.0 97.7 79.1 61.6 58.1 52.3
CT 97 77.4 54.8 78.3 87.1 76.3 62.4 59.1 61.3
CT 98 87.7 37.0 75.0 84.0 72.8 55.6 45.7 50.0
CT 99 76.6 49.4 74.0 89.6 75.3 54.5 51.9 50.6
RBG 94 67.1 75.0 64.7 59.5 76.5 80.0 54.1 82.7
RBG 95 65.8 72.7 68.4 58.2 75.9 83.5 55.1 74.7
RBG 96 67.4 79.1 69.4 58.1 67.4 79.1 58.1 81.4
RBG 97 74.2 77.4 65.2 58.1 74.2 86.0 59.1 82.8
RBG 98 51.9 74.1 62.5 53.1 61.7 84.0 45.7 76.3
RBG 99 59.7 85.7 66.2 45.5 55.8 88.3 51.9 80.5
SGB 94 67.1 70.7 74.4 59.3 72.0 82.9 58.5 82.7
SGB 95 58.2 74.0 74.7 54.4 68.4 88.6 48.7 74.7
SGB 96 60.5 77.9 67.1 53.5 65.1 76.7 52.3 81.4
SGB 97 73.1 76.3 75.0 57.0 78.5 83.9 61.3 82.8
SGB 98 56.3 70.0 68.4 50.0 60.0 78.8 50.0 76.3
SGB 99 66.2 76.6 72.7 53.2 59.7 81.8 50.6 80.5
Average 71.3 59.9 71.9 66.0 71.9 70.2 65.2 68.6 68.4
STD 12.4 13.5 9.0 14.4 9.3 10.3 15.1 11.3 10.9
Diff. 59.0 46.4 62.9 51.6 62.5 60.0 51.1 57.3 57.5
The average "frequency with which each" Justice "vote[s]
together" with each of his or her colleagues "in full opinion de-
cisions" measures that Justice's proximity to the Court's ideo-
logical center of gravity.15 3 All other things being equal, a high
average suggests greater comfort with the Court's collective po-
litical preferences. By contrast, the standard deviation among
any one Justice's rates of agreement with his or her colleagues
reflects that Justice's propensity toward favoritism in building
coalitions. "The higher the standard deviation, the more vio-
lent the disparity in an individual Justice's voting alignments
with his or her colleagues"-and commensurately lower that
Justice's ability to forge distinct alliances. 154  We therefore
treat the difference between the average and the standard de-
viation as a rough measure of collegiality.
153. Id. at 404.
154. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 90.
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By this gauge, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
fare quite well; all three register at or above sixty. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist follows closely in fourth place at 59.0. The three
Justices most often regarded as occupying the ideological fron-
tiers of the Court--Justices Scalia and Thomas on the right,
and Justice Stevens on the left-fare relatively poorly. All
three hover at or even discernibly below fifty. Justice Thomas's
whopping 15.1 standard deviation is two-thirds higher than the
9.0 figure posted by Justice O'Connor, while Justice Stevens's
average of 59.9 is less than the average minus standard devia-
tion for Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
In short, the final "plus factor" favors the trio that wrote
the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey.1 55 The Chief Justice follows closely enough
to merit honorable mention.
E. THERE HE IS: THE MOST DANGEROUS JUSTICE
We believe we have a winner. Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor dominate all three indirect measures of voting
strength. Their frequent participation in the conservative bloc
that has decided some of the most prominent and controversial
cases of the past decade distinguishes them from Justice
Souter. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for his part, did well enough
to ratify his inclusion as a Power Pageant finalist. Unlike Jus-
tice Kennedy, however, Justice O'Connor performed poorly on
our direct measures of voting power on the Court. Her robust
performance on casual measures of strength cannot outweigh
her failure to register bigger numbers in the formal tests. Jus-
tice O'Connor, after all, failed to qualify as a finalist at the con-
clusion of the Power Pageant's strictly quantitative phase. She
was battling to distinguish herself from Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Thomas, not striving to dethrone Justices Kennedy
and Souter. We therefore disqualify her from contention for the
title of Most Dangerous Justice.
In that case, please pass the envelope. Associate Justice
David H. Souter is our First Runner-Up, and William H.
Rehnquist may now add Mr. Congeniality to his title as Chief
Justice of the United States. The Most Dangerous Justice of
the Clinton-Rehnquist Court is...
Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
155. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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IV. THE SUPPLE IN SPIRIT SHALL INHERIT THE
KINGDOM OF POWER
A. MATHEMATIcAL MOVEMENT AND MAYHEM IN THE
MARKETPLACE OF SCHEMES
1. Divergence and Congruence
Having named Justice Kennedy the winner of the Power
Pageant of the Justices, we now move to a competition of utter
political insignificance but substantial methodological interest.
In the end, have we successfully deflected Professor Lynn
Baker's criticisms? Have we whipped the competition in our
little corner in the marketplace of schemes? And hardest of all:
which of the six competing measures reviewed in this Article
gives the most reliable answers to questions of power on the
Supreme Court? Every developer of a mathematically informed
model mutters sotto voce, "There are these recipes... these
equations that seem to rule the world." 156 We seek some assur-
ance that we have moved closer toward grasping the mathe-
matical underpinnings of the traffic in persuasive power within
the Supreme Court.
Call it the Power Pageant of the Indexes. Unlike its coun-
terpart at the highest court in the land, this pageant does not
yield dividends in the guise of precedents and pronouncements.
Rather, the winner of this Power Pageant will grab "the only
coin" most scholars deem "worth having": the "applause" of our
academic peers.1
57
We start with two assumptions. First, we assume that
there really are differences in voting power among the Justices.
Even Lynn Baker agrees that there is a Most Dangerous Jus-
. ,,158
tice and that his or her "identity... matter[s]. Second, we
also assume that the distribution of power among the Justices
remains reasonably stable over time. This assumption drives
our search for more information on the Court's voting patterns
and our preference for cumulative over Term-by-Term applica-
156. DAVID BERLINSKI, THE ADVENT OF THE ALGORiTHM: THE IDEA THAT
RULES THE WORLD 20 (2000).
157. Paul A. Samuelson, Economists and the History of Ideas, 52 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 18 (1962).
158. Baker, supra note 2, at 207.
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tions of our indexes. The Justices do appear to shift over time,
but we presume that even ideological evolution and shifts in po-
litical savvy have their limits.
Combining our core assumptions yields two criteria for as-
sessing measures of voting power on the Supreme Court. First,
any index should reflect significant differences in power among
the Justices. There is no validity in an index that converges at
the benchmarks of an 11.1 power rating and a JQ of 100 for
each Justice. In other words, a valid index should reflect some
differences among the Justices, and those differences should be
attributable to uneven degrees of power.
Second, once enough information has accumulated, a valid
index should not vary substantially. Significant Term-to-Term
instability in a mature index, as evidenced by wild swings in
individual Justices' ratings, is as undesirable as complete con-
vergence. Indeed, precision among competing measures of vot-
ing power-if not the accuracy of each individual gauge-can be
computed through convergence among indexes. Indexes that
report meaningful information should reach some sort of con-
sensus. One must take care to distinguish the generally desir-
able phenomenon of convergence among indexes from conver-
gence within a single index, which sounds the death knell for
that index.
Of these criteria, the first is much easier to satisfy. In our
study, every measure but one avoids the dreaded fate of dis-
solving into a pool of perfectly equal Justices, each wielding
11.1% of the Court's power. Attaining mathematical congru-
ence among superficially meaningful indexes, however, may
prove more difficult. If separate indexes do not begin to resem-
ble each other over time, two explanations are possible. On one
hand, at least one of the indexes may be invalid. On the other,
each index may be valid in its own domain. The coalitional
structure underlying the Supreme Court may be as complex as
it is deep. Of itself, the fact that so many of these measures of
voting power have yielded superficially plausible information
suggests that different measures may simply measure different
things. In that event, the failure of indexes to converge de-
mands a more nuanced explanation of the dynamics underlying
each index.
Finally, mindful of the roots of our 1996 articles, we prefer
indexes that perform well both in the short run and in the long
run. Of these time frames, the long run is easier to satisfy. As
cases accumulate, a valid measure of power on the Supreme
194 [Vol. 86:131
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Court should neither dissolve into meaningless equality nor os-
cillate wildly. But the long run is a long time, and the Court
rarely retains the same personnel for more than three or four
years. The Most Dangerous Justice represented an elaborate
effort to find short-term insights into the power dynamics
among a potentially evanescent group of nine Justices. Once
we identify a set of credible long-run gauges of power on the
Court, we hope to find indexes that can reliably predict long-
run trends with a single Term's worth of information.
2. Infant Mortality
Not every index described and deployed in this study will
compete in the Power Pageant of the Indexes. Even before en-
gaging in more rigorous tests of these indexes, we can partially
or fully disqualify two of our indexes and two of Professor
Baker's proposed measures of the median Justice. Our sophis-
ticated index offers no value on a Term-by-Term basis. Its an-
nual applications are routinely riddled with zeros and absurdly
high power ratings. Whatever value lurks in the sophisticated
index can be realized only in a long-run, cumulative applica-
tion.
Our generalized Banzhaf index has the opposite problem.
Though it might shed meaningful light on the Justices' per-
formances each Term, it rapidly erodes as it accumulates in-
formation. To put it bluntly, the full-blown measure of feasibil-
ity developed in The Most Dangerous Justice flunks the test of
time. We acknowledged in 1996 that we introduced the tech-
nique of inferring feasibility from the intersection of observed
coalitions solely to solve the problem of small numbers. 159 Now
that we have a fuller set of data, the fancy mathematics are no
longer necessary. Indeed, they affirmatively impair long-run
assessment of the Power Pageant of the Justices. Inferred fea-
sibility eventually overstates the number of feasible coalitions.
By the end of the 2000 Term, our feasibility measure reported
that 497 of 512 theoretically possible coalitions were politically
feasible. This strikes us as extremely unlikely. After seven
Terms, the number of distinct, actually observed majority coali-
tions reached only ninety-five, well short of the theoretical limit
of 256. More than half of these ninety-five emerged in the first
two Terms of our study. We believe that the Justices are ap-
proaching the political limits on their ability to cooperate.
159. See Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 75, 86.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Let us restate our conclusion more formally: As the num-
ber of actual cases increases, the artifice of inferring feasible
coalitions decays in effectiveness. A sufficiently diverse array
of actually observed coalitions will generate a constantly in-
creasing set of unobserved but presumably feasible coalitions.
As that number approaches 512, the judicial quotient for all
Justices will approach 100. At that point the algorithm for in-
ferring feasibility can no longer be regarded as valid.
At most our generalized Banzhaf index remains useful as a
short-run tool, when fuller information is unavailable. As we
noted in Table 1 in Part II.A.4, the Justices have formed 209
unique coalitions out of a possible total of 512. As applied to
the 1994 Term, the generalized Banzhaf index predicted a total
of 308 coalitions. Applying the same methodology to the next
Term (and only that Term) generated 228 coalitions. If, as we
expect, the ceiling on the Justices' ability to cooperate is sub-
stantially lower than the theoretically upward limit of 512 coa-
litions but somewhat higher than the 209 coalitions observed to
date, the generalized Banzhaf index may retain some value.
We hasten to stress, however, that the generalized Banzhaf in-
dex becomes less reliable with the accrual of more information.
In Part IV.C below, we will determine the precise extent to
which the generalized Banzhaf index predicts long-run results
under the naive and sophisticated indexes and the modified
median measure.
Although we concede that the quest for a median Justice
does not altogether lack merit, we also eliminate Lynn Baker's
standard measure and decision method from further considera-
tion. Both of Professor Baker's measures exhibit a trait that we
consider deleterious: inclusion of multiple cases decided by the
same coalition. Her standard measure in particular confers far
too much weight to unanimous decisions. Nine-to-nothing is
not only the most frequent margin of victory on the Court; it is
also the margin that says the least about coalitional possibili-
ties among the Justices.
The stark political tilt of Professor Baker's decision method
exposes a second flaw. No other power index divides the Court
into fractions separated not only by power but also by ideology.
The decision method depicts a Court of five conservatives, ex-
erting various levels of influence but all exceeding their ex-
pected power, and four uniformly impotent liberals. This im-
plausible result derives from the large number of cases decided
by a single five-Justice alliance-that of Chief Justice
[Vol. 86:131
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Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Tho-
mas. The same defect lurks within Baker's standard measure
but becomes dramatically more visible in the decision method,
which lacks the dampening effect of other coalitions.
Whereas our generalized Banzhaf index has died a baroque
death, excessive simplicity cripples Lynn Baker's response to
our original proposal. The work of the Supreme Court tran-
scends the unidimensional approach of the Shapley-Shubik in-
dex and Professor Baker's variation on that theme. Few "easy"
cases reach the high court. 160 The Court's recent tendency to
splinter into smaller coalitions and to write a greater number of
separate opinions suggests that the docket is growing increas-
ingly complex."' "It verges on the unsporting to name a... Su-
preme Court controversy" that hinges on more than a single le-
gal issue. 62 At least one scholar speaks explicitly of distinct
"legal" and "policy" dimensions along which Justices must ne-
gotiate in order to forge a single winning coalition. 163 Professor
Baker's rudimentary approach cannot overcome that single
layer of additional complexity.
We nevertheless cannot categorically reject a measurement
based on the assumption that there is a discernible median
Justice. The modified median measure satisfies our two basic
criteria: It neither converges toward the 11.1 power rating/100
JQ benchmark nor exhibits wild variations in its results. In
methodological terms, it closely resembles Baker's standard
measure. Both indexes count all coalitions, in contrast with
our focus on five- and four-Justice coalitions. The modified me-
dian measure's principal advantage lies in its exclusion of mul-
tiple cases decided by the same coalition. That technique,
which it shares with our naive and sophisticated indexes,
spares the modified median measure of defects that afflict
Baker's standard measure and decision method. The modified
median measure suffers from neither the dilution attributable
to multiple crediting of unanimous decisions nor the docket
160. See Saul Brenner & Theodore S. Arrington, Unanimous Decision
Making on the U.S. Supreme Court: Case Stimuli and Judicial Attitudes, 9 POL.
BEHAV. 75, 83-84 (1987).
161. See Scott P. Johnson, The Influence of Case Complexity on the Opinion
Writing of the Rehnquist Court, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 45, 58 (1999); see also Saul
Brenner, Tony Caporale, & Harold Winter, Fluidity and Coalition Sizes on the
Supreme Court, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 245, 252-53 (1996) (suggesting institutional
reasons that discourage Justices from coalescing around a losing legal position).
162. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 231.
163. See Cross, supra note 15, at 551.
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bias aggravated by the multiple crediting of five-Justice coali-
tions. It confirms the wisdom of counting the number of unique
coalitions rather than the frequency with which they recur.
In short, though we reject the specific measures that Pro-
fessor Baker proposed, we will give our chief critic the methodo-
logical benefit of the doubt. The modified median measure will
advance in the Power Pageant of the Indexes, where it will sus-
tain the possibility that a Supreme Court power index can be
based on a search for the median Justice.
3. Staying Alive
Two measures out of six satisfy the initial demands of di-
vergence from the 100 JQ benchmark and congruence over
time: our naive index and the modified median measure that
we developed in response to Lynn Baker's criticisms of our
original proposal. Our sophisticated index reports no usable
results on a Term-by-Term basis, but it may provide valid in-
formation if calculated on a cumulative basis. Our generalized
Banzhaf index is its mirror image. Over the long run, it dis-
solves completely into a pool of equal power ratings. Computed
annually, however, it may predict the long-run results of the
naive index, sophisticated index, or modified median measure.
We will stage a Power Pageant of the Indexes in two
phases. First, we will compare three indexes to see whether
their results converge over the long run. Second, mindful that
the cohesion of the Court's personnel over seven Terms is his-
torically rare, we will test a separate set of three indexes for
their ability in the short run, on a Term-by-Term basis, to pre-
dict the Justices' long-run power ratings. The naive index, so-
phisticated index, and the modified median measure will com-
pete in the long-run phase of this pageant. Term-by-Term
applications of the naive index, generalized Banzhaf index, and
the modified median measure will compete as alternative short-
run methods of predicting the three long-run measures.
Once again, let the games begin.
B. THE POWER PAGEANT OF THE INDEXES
1. Madness in Our Methodology
One mathematical tool looms large in this methodological
Power Pageant. Root mean square error analysis provides a
rough measurement of congruence between two indexes. Con-
sider, for instance, a comparison of our naive and sophisticated
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indexes for October Term 1994. Our naive index reported that
Chief Justice Rehnquist exerted 13.8% of the Court's voting
power during the 1994 Term and that Justice O'Connor regis-
tered 10.7% on the same scale. According to the sophisticated
index for the same time frame, the Chief Justice captured
13.3% of the Court's power, while Justice O'Connor garnered
20.0%. To compute the mean square error, we square the dif-
ference between the two indexes for each Justice and add those
results. To wit:
(0.138 - 0.133)2 +... + (0.107 - 0.200)2 +...
We then take the square root of this sum. The smaller the
result, the closer the indexes in question.
Root mean square error analysis is flexible enough to ac-
commodate all combinations of short- and long-run results: an-
nual results can be compared with annual results, cumulative
results can be compared with cumulative results, and annual
results can be compared with cumulative results. We will use
it in two ways. First, to test congruence among indexes over
the long run, we will compare running cumulative results of the
naive index, sophisticated index, and the modified median
measure after each Term. Second, to assess the ability of in-
dexes to predict long-run results from a single Term's results,
we will compare Term-by-Term results from the naive index,
the generalized Banzhaf index, and the modified median meas-
ure with the cumulative results after October Term 2000 of the
naive index, the sophisticated index, and the modified median
measure.
2. The Congruence Contest
We first report two similar root mean square error analy-
ses. Both analyses compare two indexes on a running cumula-
tive basis. The second column in the following table compares
the naive and sophisticated indexes; the third compares the
modified median measure with the sophisticated index:
199
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Table 23: Root Mean Square Error Analysis, Running
Cumulative Results; Naive Index and Modified Median
Measure Versus Sophisticated Index
Term(s) Naive v. sophisticated Modified median v.
sophisticated
1994 0.215 0.199
1994-95 0.159 0.171
1994-96 0.149 0.156
1994-97 0.070 0.070
1994-98 0.041 0.039
1994-99 0.066 0.066
1994-2000 0.088 0.085
We have reported these indexes together because they re-
port substantially, even strikingly, similar results. Both the
naive index and the modified median measure begin as poor
matches for the sophisticated index, registering root mean
square errors near or above 0.200. In the following four Terms,
the accretion of additional cases decided by the Court consis-
tently and dramatically reduced this error by a factor of five.
At the end of the 1998 Term, a root mean square error of
roughly 0.040 suggested that both the naive index and the
modified median measure were much more congruent with the
sophisticated index.
But the comparison reversed course over the 1999 and
2000 Terms. After both Terms, both the naive index and the
modified median measure exhibited greater divergence from
the sophisticated index. Taking the 1999 and 2000 Terms into
account actually yields an increase rather than a decrease in
the root mean square error. The final figures, 0.088 and 0.085
respectively, cast doubt on at least one of our assumptions.
Sudden divergence among competing indexes undermines
the hypothesis that the Court's deep coalitional structure re-
mains relatively stable over time. The instability in Table 23
can be attributed to the sophisticated index in general and to
Justice Souter's swift rise in particular. Justice Souter's surge
in our sophisticated index after the 1999 Term suggests either
a radical shift in power or a flaw in our methodology. We
would prefer to find concrete, convincing evidence of similar
shifts in power from Term to Term, but neither our technique
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nor our data can resolve the problem conclusively. In fact, the
cumulative results of our naive and sophisticated indexes differ
considerably from the average of the results for individual
Terms.
Volatility within coalitions can certainly alter the distribu-
tion of power on the Supreme Court. For example, Justice
Kennedy's dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart164 suggests that his
famous alliance with Justices O'Connor and Souter in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey165 may be
collapsing. If so, we should abandon or at least modify our as-
sumption that the distribution of power among Justices will
remain stable. As we acknowledged in The Sultans of Swing,
"[n]o one... would equate the Harry Blackmun of October
Term 1971 with the Harry Blackmun of October Term 1993."166
The faster the Justices' views change, the stronger the prefer-
ence for annual analysis of coalitional possibilities over cumu-
lative data. A more nuanced approach would require us to iso-
late and discard coalitions rendered infeasible by changes in
the Justices' ideologies over time. We have little confidence in
the prospect of performing this task with any degree of accu-
racy.
On the other hand, if we isolate October Term 1999, our
sophisticated index stabilizes a bit. Perhaps the 1999 Term
was simply extraordinary. That Term alone certainly seems to
account for much of the naive index and modified median
measure's variation from the sophisticated indexes. Seven new
five-Justice coalitions appeared that Term. 167 Justice Souter
164. 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
166. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 226. Compare, e.g., Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("We should not
allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of [the death penalty], or our
distaste for [it], to guide our judicial decision in [capital] cases ... .") with, e.g.,
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) ("From this day forward, I shall no longer tinker with the
machinery of death.").
167. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) (Thomas, J., joined by Stevens,
O'Connor, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861
(2000) (Breyer, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia & Kennedy,
JJ.); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (Kennedy,
J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ.); Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000)
(Stevens, J., joined by Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Breyer, JJ.); City of Erie v.
Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Kennedy, Souter & Breyer, JJ., as to Parts I and H); Shalala v. Ill. Council on
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participated in six of these; 168 Justice Kennedy, in four.169 Even
the Harvard Law Review, despite using more stringent criteria,
recognized five new five-Justice coalitions during the 1999
Term. 170 Indeed, during the previous Term, Justice Souter led
a coalition combining his vote with those of Justices Stevens,
Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg.17 1 On the other hand, Justice
Souter's power grab was true to his reputation as the "Stealth• ,,172
Justice. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion for none
of the new five-Justice coalitions in the 1999 Term. Instead, he
passively joined each of the winning coalitions.
For purposes of explaining Justice Souter's sudden surge in
the sophisticated index, however, it is equally important to note
the coalitions that failed to include Justice Souter. Out of six
new four-Justice coalitions that first appeared during the 1999
Term, four excluded Justice Souter. The new five-Justice coali-
tions including Justice Souter magnified his raw power; the
new four-Justice coalitions excluding Justice Souter enabled
Justice Souter to abandon a corresponding number of five-
Justice majorities. Both phenomena sharply enhanced Justice
Souter's showing in the sophisticated index.
Let us contemplate a less charitable explanation. Perhaps
the sophisticated index is flawed insofar as it relies on a meas-
ure of feasibility. Recall that the sophisticated index is
Banzhafs index of power to cast a dispositive vote, modified by
a notion of feasibility that we derived strictly from observed
coalitions. The potential weakness lies in our computation of
feasibility over long stretches of time. In order to determine
which members may feasibly defect from a five-Justice coalition
that first emerges in the 1999 Term, we may reach as far back
as the 1994 Term-the earliest Term in our data set-in order
Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000) (Breyer, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and O'Connor, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.).
168. To wit: Sims, Playboy, Christensen, Carmell, Erie, and Illinois Council.
169. To wit: Geier, Playboy, Christensen, and Erie.
170. See 1999 Harvard Survey, supra note 59, at 395 (identifying Geier,
Illinois Council, Sims, Carmell, and Playboy).
171. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); see also 1998 Harvard
Survey, supra note 60, at 405.
172. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Justice Souter Emerges: Once the Stealth
Nominee, He Has Become an Intellectual Leader and the Supreme Court Has
Become Politically Unpredictable, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, § 6, at 36; Dick
Lehr, A Step Toward the Left: Souter's Surprise Shift May Alter the Court,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 1993, at All; Ruth Marcus, Souter Lessons Guide
Thomas Game Plan, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1991, at A10. See generally Liang
Kan, Comment, A Theory of Justice Souter, 45 EMORY L.J. 1373 (1996).
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to discover as many as five subcoalitions of four Justices. What
our model cannot determine is whether a four-Justice coalition
observed in 1994 may in fact have become infeasible by 1999.
We shall offer a concrete example. The coalition consisting
of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg
appeared for the first time in the 1999 Term. Justice Kennedy
wrote for this majority, over vigorous dissent, in United States
v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. 173 Justice Souter re-
ceived full credit for his participation in this coalition because
our data set includes the subcoalition consisting of Justices Ste-
vens, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg. That subcoalition,
however, appeared during the 1995 Term in a fleeting portion
of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.174 We have no way of
knowing for certain whether those four Justices could feasibly
agree on anything, to the exclusion of all the other Justices,
during the 1999 Term. Four or five Terms can be jurispruden-
tially significant on a Court that rarely requires "a single hu-
man generation .... to complete a constitutional hiccough."
175
3. Feasibility's Fate
We must complete one more root mean square error analy-
sis on a running cumulative basis. It compares the naive index
with the modified median measure:
173. 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Thomas &
Ginsburg, JJ.).
174. 517 U.S. 484,508-14 (1996) (part IV of plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
175. Jim Chen, DeFunis, Defunct, 16 CONST. CO MENT. 91, 98 (1999).
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Table 24: Root Mean Square Error Analysis, Running
Cumulative Results; Naive Index Versus Modified Median
Measure
Term(s) Root mean square error
1994 0.055
1994-95 0.051
1994-96 0.049
1994-97 0.042
1994-98 0.038
1994-99 0.035
1994-2000 0.030
The naive index and the modified median index, the sim-
plest measures in this study, actually exhibit congruence over
time. These two indexes may be the only ones that exhibit con-
crete evidence of long-run coalitional stability. The relatively
small root mean square error between these indexes continu-
ally decreases until it reaches a miniscule 0.030 after the 2000
Term.
These results suggest that the naive index and the modi-
fied median measure may become indistinguishable as Su-
preme Court decisions accumulate over multiple Terms. We
will address that possibility in due course. The very fact that
the naive index and the modified median measure are squaring
off undermines the foundations of our sophisticated index and
our generalized Banzhaf index. The development of those in-
dexes constituted the bulk of our work in The Most Dangerous
Justice and The Sultans of Swing. We will therefore first ad-
dress this potentially subversive challenge to our methodology.
A simpler measure such as the naive index or the modified
median measure may provide a more reliable long-run measure
of voting power among Supreme Court Justices. The naive
measure is less susceptible than its sophisticated counterpart
to inevitable changes in individual Justices' points of view. A
similar immunity to distortion over time is true of the modified
median measure. Both of these measures omit the feasibility
analysis that is the hallmark of the sophisticated and general-
ized Banzhaf indexes. To acknowledge this trait as a strength,
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however, rudely overthrows one of our basic assumptions. The
naive index tacitly assumes that every member of a five-Justice
coalition is capable of defecting. The modified median measure
likewise ignores the fragility of provisional alliances that arise
and collapse as the Justices forge decisive coalitions.
We developed the sophisticated index and the generalized
Banzhaf index in response to two problems: (1) the size of the
data set then available to us and (2) the inability to gauge
whether every member of a winning coalition could have de-
fected. Time, aided by the fortuity of stable Supreme Court
membership across seven Terms, eliminated the problem of
small numbers. In 1996 we recognized "that a larger number of
cases decided by a single Court [might] obviate the need to rely
on a mathematical surrogate for the Justices' coalition-building
propensities." 176 On this point, at least, we proved prophetic.
On the other hand, we may have overestimated the ideo-
logical limitations on a Justice's ability to defect. Feasibility
may be a much weaker impediment than we imagined. It
might not even exist. What we have learned about the Court's
internal dynamics suggests that all coalitions may be logically
feasible, though perhaps not equally likely to emerge in any
given case or within any particular time frame.
If in fact feasibility is not as salient a concern as we origi-
nally assumed, must we also question our assumption "that the
only time that an individual Justice's vote matters is when he
is in a coalition of exactly five Justices"?177 This question holds
the key to the contest between the naive index and the modified
median measure. If we also abandon this assumption, which
lies at the heart of John Banzhafs measure of power, we might
lose our basis for preferring the naive index over the broader
modified median measure. Professor Baker could renew her
critique that our focus on "decisions in which the winning coali-
tion numbers precisely five Justices" comes at the expense "of
ignoring as much as eighty percent of the available data."
178
This line of criticism is not without force. Generally speak-
ing, the smaller a losing coalition, the greater the likelihood
that a nonprevailing Justice will change his or her vote.179 This
176. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 225.
177. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 66.
178. Baker, supra note 2, at 202.
179. See Brenner et al., supra note 161, at 249-52; Saul Brenner & Robert H.
Dorff, The Attitudinal Model and Fluidity Voting on the United States Supreme
Court: A Theoretical Perspective, 4 J. THEORETCAL POL. 195, 198-200 (1992);
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insight suggests that we might have erred in emphasizing the
potential of a five-Justice coalition's pivotal member to defect.
Perhaps we should have looked instead at the marginal pro-
pensity of a member in a losing four-Justice coalition to join the
majority. Indeed, a four-Justice minority is less stable than a
three-Justice minority.180 Except for the transformation of a 5-
4 into a 6-3 decision, researchers interested "in exploring Su-
preme Court behavior... should focus on dissenters rather
than on the majority."181
Rehabilitation of our naive index, let alone assertion of its
dominance over the modified median measure, depends on a
defense of our focus on five-Justice coalitions. To that task we
now turn.
4. The Niftiness of Nalvet6
We believe that a focus on five-Justice coalitions fulfills
certain important functions. The 5-4 decision retains its mys-
tique-and its importance. "On the Court, four is the loneliest
number," because it takes five to fly. 182 No less an authority
than Learned Hand has asked, "Who in hell cares what any-
body says about [constitutional law] but the Final Five of the
august Nine... ?,,183 Five-to-four is the typical winning mar-
gin,184 or at least the second most typical (behind the unani-
mous Court).185 Why indeed does the Court seem to oscillate
between unanimity and complete division? A 5-4 split provides
far more information than a unanimous opinion on the Court's
coalitional structures and propensities. Five-Justice coalitions
arguably fight hardest to maintain or even to extend their mar-
gin of victory.186 Justices routinely dilute opinions to retain the
Robert H. Dorff & Saul Brenner, Conformity Voting on the United States
Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 762, 768 (1993); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger
Court, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 581, 587-89 (1996).
180. See Edelman & Sherry, supra note 35, at 1227, 1245-46.
181. Id. at 1227.
182. Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 233.
183. ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 384
(1956) (quoting correspondence from Judge Hand to then-Justice Stone).
184. WLLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO
POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 177 (1973) (asserting that winning coalitions "will
be no larger than they need to be").
185. See Edelman & Sherry, supra note 35, at 1226 & n.3 (ranking 5-4
decisions second in frequency behind unanimous decisions).
186. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 66, 74.
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crucial fifth vote.1 87  Undoubtedly the truest Supreme Court
maxim remains: "Five votes can do anything around here."
188
The loss of a fifth vote, of course, is fatal to a majority coa-
lition. But even the failure to attract a sixth vote exposes a de-
cision to a heightened probability of overruling by a later Court,
reversal through congressional action, or lack of faithful im-
plementation in the lower courts. 189 All of these possibilities re-
inforce an oft-neglected truth: As a form of literature, Supreme
Court opinions are not immune to the rhetorical and critical
forces that shape the fate of all texts in the interpretive com-
munities that receive them.
1 90
The one-vote margin of a 5-4 decision delivers victory, but
evidently with diminished persuasive force. The Justices
themselves accord less respect to 5-4 decisions. 191 Congress ap-
pears more willing to throttle statutory decisions rendered by a
narrow margin. 192 Even more intriguingly, expanding a five-
Justice majority may forestall disrespect or outright defiance
by the lower courts that are chiefly responsible for implement-
ing nearly all of the Supreme Court's decisions, whether statu-
tory or constitutional in nature. 193 There is some evidence that
187. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How THE SUPREME COURT
DECIDES CASES 222 (1996) (describing how Justice Brennan diluted Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in order to keep Justice Stewart as the winning
coalition's fifth vote).
188. Id. at 6 (attributing this aphorism to Justice Brennan); JAMES F. SIMON,
THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT 54
(1995) (same).
189. See Edelman & Sherry, supra note 35, at 1244-45 & n.67.
190. See generally Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary
Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUIAN. 201 (1990).
191. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996)
(plurality opinion) ("Because the 5-to-4 decision in [Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986)] marked such a sharp break from
our prior precedent, and because it concerned a constitutional question about
which this Court is the final arbiter, we decline to give force to its highly
deferential approach."); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994)
(suggesting that the "degree of confusion following a splintered" Supreme Court
decision constitutes "a reason for reexamining that decision"); MURPHY, supra
note 8, at 66; Cross, supra note 15, at 555-56.
192. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 346-47 (1991); Beth Henschen,
Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional Response, 11 AM.
POL. Q. 441, 447 (1983); Thomas R. Marshall, Policymaking and the Modern
Court: When Do Supreme Court Rulings Prevail?, 42 W. POL. Q. 493, 495 (1989).
193. See Cross, supra note 15, at 563; Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1989, 2018, 2031 (1996) (observing
that reliance on lower courts for implementation forces the Supreme Court to
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lower courts give less credence to narrow or splintered Su-
preme Court decisions. 194 At the very least, it appears easier to
recite than to apply the rule that governs a "fragmented" deci-
sion in which "no single rationale explain[s] ... the assent of
five Justices: 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judg-
ment[] on the narrowest grounds."' 95 That lower courts are
formally bound to heed the Supreme Court's decisions' 96 does
not foreclose idle speculation about violating the strict rule of
vertical stare decisis.
197
Let us consider the opposite possibility. Might our error lie
in underestimating rather than overestimating the Justices' po-
litical instincts? We originally assumed that "the Justices vote
respect its own precedent to some degree); Emerson H. Tiller, Putting Politics
into the Positive Theory of Federalism: A Comment on Bednar and Eskridge, 68
S. CAL. L. REV. 1493, 1499-1500 (1995) (hypothesizing that sound reasoning at
the Supreme Court level raises costs for lower courts that might contemplate
evasion of putatively binding precedent). See generally Lawrence Baum,
Implementation of Judicial Decisions: An Organizational Analysis, 4 AM. POL.
Q. 86 (1976). For critiques of the closely related phenomenon of plurality
opinions, see John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality
Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59; Douglas J. Whaley, A
Suggestion for the Prevention of No-Clear-Majority Judicial Decisions, 46 TEXY L.
REV. 370 (1968); Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1981).
194. See, e.g., King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781-83 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(declaring a court of appeals' inability to decipher Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987), because of alleged
inconsistencies between the plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in the judgment); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics
Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 17 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("We must be cautious in extending five
to four decisions by analogy .... "); United States v. Kennesaw Mountain
Battlefield Ass'n, 99 F.2d 830, 833-34 (5th Cir. 1938) (" ilt is not controlling for
the further reason, that that case, decided as it was by a closely divided court, is
authority only for its own facts, and those facts are not present here."); cf
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir.) (refusing to accord deference to
"Justice Powell's lonely opinion" in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
195. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, The
Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law,
17 CONST. COMMENT. 321 (2000).
196. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1997); Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 180 (1990) (plurality opinion); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); Hutto v. Davis,
454 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1982) (per curiam).
197. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May
Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535,
1538 n.8, 1597 n.169 (2000).
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strictly to legal principle and do not trade votes as though they
were so many horses at a swap meet." 98 This assumption is
thoroughly grounded in legal convention. "[C]ynical strategiz-
ing by the Court seems the very essence of democratic be-
trayal."199 American legal culture upholds a strong separation
of judicial craftsmanship from politics.200 More than four dec-
ades after Herbert Wechsler advocated a "genuinely principled"
judicial process grounded in "analysis and reasons quite tran-
scending the immediate result that is achieved,"201 "the concept
of neutral principles remains an article of faith."202 True to this
creed, explicit "logrolling seldom if ever occurs on the Court."20 3
Efforts to expose outright vote-swapping have unearthed no
evidence.204 Surprising though it may seem, "some judges feel
an obligation to do the job right."20 5
On the other hand, less overt forms of judicial cooperation
do exist. In a less charitable mood, we might call them "soft
logrolling."206 At a minimum, judges follow a well established
"norm" of "sacrific[ing] details of their convictions in the service
of producing an outcome and opinion attributable to the
198. Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 73.
199. Book Note, Democracy and Dishonesty, 106 HARV. L. REV. 792, 794(1993) (reviewing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE
SUPREME COURT'S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING
WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND (1992)).
200. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5; Rubin & Feeley, supra note 193, at
2026 (arguing that judges take seriously "institutionally induced beliefs about
the way they should carry out their official functions"); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 120 (1992) ("Most judges hold deeply
internalized role constraints and believe that judgment is not politics.").
201. Herbert Wechsler, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959).
202. Susan Bandes, Book Note, Erie and the History of the One True
Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829, 832 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.,
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER,
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(2000)).
203. Cross, supra note 15, at 566.
204. See ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 160
(2d ed. 1991); Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 748, 764 n.86 (1995).
205. Thomas 0. McGarity, On Making Judges Do the Right Thing, 44 DUKE
L.J. 1104, 1105 (1995).
206. See Cross, supra note 15, at 566-67; Frank B. Cross & Emerson H.
Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998).
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court."20 7 Justice Stevens famously concurred in a "judgment
vacating and remanding for further proceedings," contrary to
his own "view that [the Court] should [have] affirm[ed] the
judgment," because a "vote to affirm" would have meant that
"no disposition of [the] appeal would [have] command[ed] the
support of a majority of the Court."208
More active forms of persuasion abound. Chief among
them is dissent.20 9 Dissent "safeguards the integrity of the ju-
dicial decision-making process by keeping the majority ac-
countable for the rationale and consequences of its decision."
210
Prominent "often in shaping and sometimes in altering the
course of the law,"211 dissenting opinions uphold "the democ-
ratic faith."212 Every dissent, after all, is merely "an appeal to
the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into
which ... the court [has ostensibly] been betrayed."213 Particu-
larly persuasive draft dissents instantly become opinions for
the Court; one study found that draft dissents affected a quar-
ter of putatively "landmark" cases and a tenth of all cases de-
cided within a single Supreme Court Term.214
The effect over time can be even more dramatic. The
"Court record" that William H. Rehnquist may have set by fil-
207. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1993).
208. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 674 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
209. See generally Post, supra note 58, at 1340-55 (tracing changes in
Supreme Court Justices' attitudes toward dissent from the Taft era to the end of
the 1940s); Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court,
105 YALE L.J. 2235, 2246-58 (1996) (arguing that the practice of dissent reveals
the deliberative character of a court's decisionmaking process and is therefore a
source ofjudicial legitimacy).
210. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427,
430 (1986); cf Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. CT. HIsT.
33, 41 (suggesting that the chronic absence of dissent would lead a judge "to
suspect that his colleagues considered him insipid, or simply not worthy of
contradiction").
211. Harlan F. Stone, Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without Value, 26
JUDICATURE 78, 78 (1942).
212. William 0. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32
JUDICATURE 104, 105 (1948) (praising "the uncertainty of the law" as a source of
democratic "strength and glory").
213. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
68(1928).
214. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 77-78 (surveying the authors'
own list of"landmark" cases and October Term 1983 in its entirety).
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ing fifty-four solo dissents as an Associate Justice 15 arguably
paved the way for the conservative landmarks established un-
der his leadership. Then-Justice Rehnquist endured long
enough to fulfill his "confident" prophecy in dissent that a ro-
bust view of federalism would "in time again command the
support of a majority of [the] Court."216 Then again, the trans-
formation of a heroic dissent into a future majority opinion may
more properly belong to the realm of legend. Most dissenters
tend to be holdovers from an eclipsed majority rather than her-
alds of a future coalition.217 In reprising the role of "the gladia-
tor making a last stand against the lions," the dissenter is no
more likely to taste success than his or her Roman predeces-
sor.2 18  As then-Justice Rehnquist pointedly observed, "com-
ments in [a] dissenting opinion... are just that: comments in a
dissenting opinion."
219
Politics at the Supreme Court ultimately eludes analysis
simply because it eludes detection. More than two-thirds of all
Supreme Court cases involve some form of intramural bargain-
ing through memoranda circulated to the entire Conference of
the Justices. 220 Such information comes to light, if ever, only
through the release of a deceased Justice's records. 221 There is
215. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM 29, 31-32 (1990);
Laura Y, Ray, A Law Clerk and His Justice: What William Rehnquist Did Not
Learn from Robert Jackson, 29 IND. L. REV. 535, 586 n.316 (1996).
216. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also William Blodgett, Just You Wait, Harry
Blackmun, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 3 (1986) (setting to music then-Justice
Rehnquists retort to Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Garcia); cf, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991).
217. See John Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Background of
the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 196
(1962).
218. BENJAMUN CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 34 (1931); accord Bd. of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 708 (1994)
(describing a dissent by Justice Scalia as "certainly the work of a gladiator,"
even though "he thrusts at lions of his own imagining").
219. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980).
220. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 9, at 74 tbl.3-2 (reporting a rate of
70% for the landmark cases of the 1970s and 1980s).
221. Justice Marshall's papers are probably the most (in)famous of such
sources. See generally, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
OF THE REHNQUIST COURT (1996); James A. Thomson, Inside the Supreme
Court: A Sanctum Sanctorum?, 66 MiSs. L.J. 177 (1996); Mark V. Tushnet, The
Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967-1991: The View from the
Marshall Papers, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1995).
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no way to track the bargaining that occurs through private
memoranda and oral communication.
As one of several plausible long-run gauges of Supreme
Court voting power, the naive index does boast some intuitively
attractive results. Minor fluctuations aside, the naive index,
the sophisticated index, and the modified median measure all
place Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist atop the Court. The bottom of each index reflects
greater variation. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg finish at the
bottom of the sophisticated index, while Justices Scalia, Tho-
mas, and O'Connor bring up the rear according to the naive in-
dex. The modified median measure blends these assessments:
It clusters Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Thomas, and Stevens in a
virtual four-way tie for last place. Legal observers may dis-
agree over whether the relatively liberal or the relatively con-
servative wing of the Court wields less influence, but we side
with those who regard Justices Scalia and Thomas as more
ideologically rigid and therefore less capable of forming coali-
tions.
Although we can generally assume that Justices, like all
other judges, "like to win (or to be perceived as 'winners'),"222 it
is almost certain that some Justices prefer victory more than
others and are willing to accommodate their colleagues on finer
legal points in order to magnify their voting power. (If nothing
else, a Justice can enjoy the "vanity value [of] authoring a ma-
jority opinion.")223 Justice Kennedy allegedly has adopted a
"deliberate strategy" of "[ojccupying the pivot" on today's
Court.224  By contrast, we have an admittedly untested and
perhaps untestable hunch that Justices Scalia and Thomas pre-
fer scoring ideological points and may even be willing to sacri-
fice an occasional imperfect victory in order to do so.
Several areas of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence indi-
rectly support this conjecture. Justices Scalia and Thomas
have routinely followed their own drummer in dormant com-
merce clause cases. 225  Even more dramatically, both have
222. Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1661 (1998).
223. Cross, supra note 15, at 550 (emphasis added).
224. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 515 (1998).
225. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 595 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 609 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 207 (1994) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496
U.S. 167, 202-05 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); cf Jim Chen,
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shown a propensity to write separately in statutory interpreta-
tion cases solely to criticize the rest of the Court's use of legisla-
tive history.226 (We leave for another time, and probably for
other scholars, the striking incongruity between this position
and Justice Scalia's chef d'ceuvre, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil.)2 27 Then again, Justice Thomas may be softening his re-
fusal to consider legislative history in statutory cases. During
the 1997 Term, Justice Scalia withheld his vote from the por-
tion of an opinion by Justice Thomas that discussed legislative
history228-and thereby deprived Justice Thomas of a Court for
that footnote.229 Perhaps not coincidentally, that Term marked
the beginning of Justice Thomas's gradual rise out of the
Court's power trough. In "demonstrat[ing] that he [is] more
than simply Justice Scalia's loyal apprentice,"230 Justice Tho-
mas is also leaving the Court's unenviable basement to Justice
Scalia.
In dissenting or concurring solely in the judgment of the
Court, Justice Scalia almost assuredly seeks to "cancel[] the
impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of [his
colleagues] so largely depends."231 Justice Scalia knows first-
hand the negative consequences of failing to secure at least five
The Mystery and the Mastery of the Judicial Power, 59 MO. L. REV. 281, 302-05
(1994) (analyzing Justice Scalia's mysterious preference for making
jurisprudential points over winning cases, at least when the dormant commerce
clause is at stake).
226. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat. Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388-91
(2000) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Conroy v.
Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 512 n.t (1993) (noting Justice Thomas's refusal to join in
a footnote that discussed legislative history, see id. at 518 n.12); id. at 518
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597, 616-23 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404-05 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849
(1989).
228. See Nat. Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S.
479,493 n.6 (1998).
229. See id. at 482 n. '.
230. SCOTr DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
CLARENCE THOMAS 139 (1999).
231. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958); see also Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 608 (1895) (White, J., dissenting)
("The only purpose which an elaborate dissent can accomplish, if any, is to
weaken the effect of the opinion of the majority, and thus engender want of
confidence in the conclusions of courts of last resort."), overruled by South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); ef N. See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Ilt is useless and undesirable, as a
rule, to express dissent....").
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votes for every jot, tittle, and footnote of a landmark opinion.232
It is Justice Scalia, after all, who has accused his colleagues of
occupying an altogether alien planet: "The Court must be living
in another world. Day by day, case by case, it is busy designing
a Constitution for a country I do not recognize.", 233 To Justice
Scalia, it has become a Court that cannot distinguish "a Kul-
turkampf [from] a fit of spite,"234 a Court that casually "sweeps
aside [its] precedents... and ignores the history of our people"
in pursuit of what it considers "the desired result."235 In what
he calls an "optimistic" mood, Justice Scalia has predicted that
one of this Court's decisions eventually "will be assigned its
rightful place... beside Korematsu and Dred Scott."231 Justice
Thomas may sympathize with such sentiments, but he rarely if
ever expresses them in such bitter terms. Therein lies the dif-
ference between a Justice who has yet to achieve his expected
share of the Court's power and a Justice who has forsworn in
its entirety the quest for power.
In the crucial struggle between the naive index and the
modified median measure, one final quantitative measure tips
the balance in favor of the naive index. Recall our initial fear
that our measures might dissolve over time into a soup of per-
fectly equal Justices. To test the propensity of the naive index
and the modified median measure to succumb to the fate that
swallowed our generalized Banzhaf index, we can determine
each index's root mean square error vis-d-vis the dreaded "con-
stant index" of 11.1 power ratings and 100 JQs across the
board. In this contest, the object is to register a relative high
root mean square error.
232. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989)
(plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (directing substantive due process analysis to
focus on the most specific level at which a novel liberty interest can be defended
on the historical record), with id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part) (declining to endorse footnote six of Justice Scalia's opinion,
which was in all other respects for the Court), and Planned Parenthood, Inc. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (rejecting the approach outlined in footnote six
of Michael H. as "inconsistent with our law").
233. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
234. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
236. Stenbergv. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Table 25: Root Mean Square Error Analysis Vis-A-Vis the
Constant Index, Naive Index, and Modified Median Measure,
Running Cumulative Results
Term(s) Naive index Modified median measure
1994 0.106 0.056
1994-95 0.087 0.042
1994-96 0.077 0.040
1994-97 0.066 0.034
1994-98 0.057 0.024
1994-99 0.055 0.025
1994-2000 0.049 0.023
Average 0.071 0.035
All other things being equal, greater distance from the con-
stant index is better. Though regression toward the mean has
afflicted both the naive index and the modified median measure
over time, the naive index reports greater variation from the
constant index and therefore greater distinctions in power
among the Justices. Its final root mean square error reading is
close to the modified median measure's initial reading.
Throughout all seven Terms, the naive index consistently dou-
bles the modified median measure's distance from the constant
benchmark. The averages for the two root mean square error
analyses confirm this trend. Since the naive index and the
modified median measure are almost equally easy to compute,
we believe that the index that reports greater variation in
power is marginally more credible. Edge to the naive index.
We hasten to add one caveat. The sophisticated index per-
forms even better relative to the constant index. The root mean
square error analysis for the sophisticated index reports a final
figure of 0.099 and a seven-Term average of 0.132. Both fig-
ures represent roughly the same degree of advantage vis-&-vis
the naive index as the naive index enjoys relative to the modi-
fied median measure. This concededly crude quantitative
measure, however, does not completely negate our doubts about
the sophisticated index. We therefore stick to our basic as-
sessment: In the long run, it's nifty to be naive.
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C. THE MESSAGE IN THE MEDIAN
Few collections of Supreme Court Justices, however, ever
reach the long run. Historically speaking, death, old age, and
boredom take their toll every other year or so. It therefore be-
hooves any chronicler of voting power on the Supreme Court to
fashion an index that reliably predicts long-run trends on the
basis of a single Term.
Three different long-run measures, we believe, reflect dif-
ferent aspects of Supreme Court voting power. We have touted
the naive index as the simplest, most reliable measure of power
among the Justices over the long run. By the same token, we
are not prepared to discard the modified median measure. The
case for preferring the naive index rests more heavily on rhe-
torical arguments than on quantitative evidence. Though we
have declined the invitation to equate the Most Dangerous Jus-
tice with the median Justice, the notion of a median will retain
its appeal as long as there are analysts who array the Justices
along a single political dimension. Finally, despite our doubts
about feasibility, the sophisticated index remains the lone
measure that explicitly assesses whether a Justice can credibly
threaten to abandon a coalition. Feasibility may be a phantom,
but it would be formidable if it ever materializes. We will
therefore try to find short-run surrogates for all three of these
long-run measures.
In the analysis that follows, we will use root mean square
error analysis to track the power of three short-run measures-
the naive index, the generalized Banzhaf index, and the modi-
fied median measure-to predict the long-run outcomes of the
naive index, the sophisticated index, and the modified median
measure. We will compare the single Term results for each of
the short-run measures from October Term 1994 through Octo-
ber Term 2000 with the cumulative results of the long-run
measures after the 2000 Term. The smaller the root mean
square error, the closer the match between the indexes in ques-
tion.
1. Predicting the Cumulative Naive Index
We begin by trying to emulate the long-run, cumulative re-
sults of our naive index through the Term-by-Term results of
three different indexes: the naive index itself, the generalized
Banzhaf index, and the modified median measure.
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Table 26: Predicting the Cumulative Naive Index; Term-by-
Term Results-Naive, Generalized Banzhaf, Modified Median
Term Naive Generalized Banzhaf Modified median
1994 0.073 0.055 0.037
1995 0.083 0.073 0.048
1996 0.066 0.085 0.026
1997 0.059 0.070 0.030
1998 0.056 0.052 0.057
1999 0.068 0.094 0.058
2000 0.068 0.077 0.039
Average 0.066 0.072 0.042
Perhaps surprisingly, the Term-by-Term version of the na-
ive index does not provide the best projection of the cumulative
naive index. In every Term, the modified median measure per-
forms best in predicting the naive index over the long run. The
generalized Banzhaf index comes very close to matching the na-
ive index. The 1999 Term, which cast a cloud on the very no-
tion of feasibility, reappears in this table as the generalized
Banzhaf index's worst Term.
2. Predicting the Cumulative Sophisticated Index
We now turn to the sophisticated index. As the following
table shows, the sophisticated index is the long-run measure
that is hardest to predict:
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Table 27: Predicting the Cumulative Sophisticated Index;
Term-by-Term Results-Naive, Generalized Banzhaf, Modified
Median
Term Naive Generalized Banzhaf Modified median
1994 0.133 0.104 0.098
1995 0.098 0.099 0.081
1996 0.119 0.106 0.081
1997 0.132 0.111 0.091
1998 0.111 0.094 0.099
1999 0.080 0.113 0.087
2000 0.087 0.106 0.070
Average 0.109 0.105 0.087
Because the two indexes share a feasibility measure, we
expected the generalized Banzhaf index to provide the most ac-
curate projection of the cumulative sophisticated index. It does
not. It outperforms only the naive index, and by a very narrow
margin at that. The modified median measure again prevails
as the best predictor of a long-run index.
To be sure, none of the short-run measures performs espe-
cially well when lined up against the cumulative sophisticated
index. All three short-run measures generate larger root mean
square errors vis-&-vis the cumulative sophisticated index than
they do relative to either of the other long-run measures. Fea-
sibility therefore proves difficult across the board: elusive to
measure in the long run with the sophisticated index, and elu-
sive to predict using short-run data from the generalized
Banzhaf index.
3. Predicting the Cumulative Modified Median Measure
To complete the picture, we turn finally to projections of
the modified median measure:
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Table 28: Predicting the Cumulative Modified Median Measure;
Term-by-Term Results-Naive, Generalized Banzhaf, Modified
Median
Term Naive Generalized Banzhaf Modified median
1994 0.090 0.045 0.040
1995 0.077 0.054 0.037
1996 0.090 0.070 0.025
1997 0.073 0.076 0.041
1998 0.045 0.034 0.031
1999 0.061 0.079 0.043
2000 0.051 0.057 0.024
Average 0.070 0.059 0.034
The modified median measure wins this final encounter.
With that victory, it sweeps all three contests to provide short-
run, single-Term surrogates for long-run information on voting
power among the Justices. The struggle for second place also
ends in interesting fashion. Paradoxically, the generalized
Banzhaf index, in spite of its greater complexity, outperforms
the naive index in predicting the modified median measure
over the long run. Again, the generalized Banzhaf index fal-
tered in the notorious 1999 Term. But it outperforms or rivals
the naive index in every other Term.
On the whole, the generalized Banzhaf index performs rea-
sonably well as a single-Term surrogate for cumulative data. It
nips the naive index in this regard. In light of the modified
median measure's sweep of all three contests, however, there
appears to be no circumstance in which we would prefer the
generalized Banzhaf index to project Supreme Court voting
power over the long run. The generalized Banzhaf index there-
fore offers neither of the advantages that would commend its
continued use: accuracy and simplicity. On this point we will
graciously concede our chief critic's objections to our "elaborate
mathematics."237 We bid farewell to the generalized Banzhaf
index as a measure of Supreme Court voting power, in the
short run as well as the long run. Bitter is the scholar's sad re-
237. Baker, supra note 2, at 190.
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frain, 'Write today, regret tomorrow, renounce mafiana."238
V. THE PERMANENCE OF THE POWER PAGEANT
To our original mission, we have remained faithful. To the
fullest of our ability, we have brought mathematics to bear on
the question of relative voting power among the Justices of the
Supreme Court. Some uses of mathematics "to give a firm
foundation for... research" in disciplines outside the tradi-
tional sciences have "led to some real insight," while others
have "produced, at best, a veneer of respectability."239 "There is
something fascinating about science. One gets such wholesale
returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of
fact."240 We have been forced, alas, to couple the limited in-
sights that mathematics can provide with a heavy dose of intui-
tion.
Although we have been forced to abandon our generalized
Banzhaf index and to temper our enthusiasm for our sophisti-
cated index, our naive index triumphs as the best long-run
gauge of Supreme Court voting power. The sophisticated in-
dex, computed cumulatively over a course of several Terms,
remains the only measure that accounts for feasibility, our
shorthand for political limits on the Justices' ability to form
coalitions. Though we remain skeptical of the existence of a
median Justice, we do embrace the modified median measure
as the best way to predict voting power among the Justices over
the long run with information from a single Term. It may be
fairest to say that the three surviving measures-the naive in-
dex, the sophisticated index, and the modified median meas-
ure-simply reflect three different aspects of voting power
among Supreme Court Justices. That phenomenon is evidently
more complex than we originally anticipated, and we make no
apologies for reaching correspondingly complex conclusions.
Most of all, we believe we have vindicated our application
of game theory to the Court. To adopt less accurate gauges of
Supreme Court voting power would strip the Power Pageant of
the Justices of all mathematical meaning and reduce the search
238. Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony's Deregulatory
Shootout, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1503, 1580 (1999).
239. Paul H. Edelman, A Tour of Mistakes, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 345
(1998).
240. MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI 109 (Harper & Row 1965);
accord Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 169 n.5 (1971) (separate opinion of
Harlan, J.).
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for the Most Dangerous Justice to a mere "parlor game."241
Even our most ardent critic agrees that "[iflor those litigating
before the Court, and even for the Justices themselves," it mat-
ters whether legal analysts have "conduct[ed] the proper Pag-
eant."242 We hope that Professor Baker will also agree that our
renewed look at the Power Pageant has settled the most impor-
tant methodological questions.
There remain diehards who believe that the Court can be
purged of its partisan stench. "When the Court no longer ulti-
mately determines the great controversies of the day," so the
faithful believe, "the other actors in the political system will not
place so much importance on controlling the selection of the
Justices., 243 For the foreseeable future, though, the Court will
continue to exert "pervasive influence on a wide range of issues
that can only in a partial and peripheral way be considered le-
gal rather than political."2 " Until further notice, the Power
Pageant of the Justices will matter.
True to the religious maxim that "the last shall be first,
and the first last,"245 we shall give the last word to the jurist
who placed dead last in the Power Pageant of the Justices.
246
The Supreme Court, an institution designed to be a step re-
moved from the maelstrom of partisan politics, yields its secrets
only to those Justices who are willing and able to seize the
241. See Dangerous Justice, supra note 1, at 68 n.25 (proposing a parlor
game as an indirect illustration of the distinction between feasible and infeasible
coalitions of Justices). Compare Sultans of Swing, supra note 3, at 228 ('The
power pageant of the Justices would be a frivolous parlor game for Supreme
Court watchers, and no more."), with Baker, supra note 2, at 207 ("Is the Power
Pageant just a parlor game? ... Do Power Pageants of the Court offer anything
more than entertainment?").
242. Baker, supra note 2, at 207.
243. John C. Yoo, Choosing Justices: A Political Appointments Process and
the Wages of Judicial Supremacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1436, 1466 (2000) (reviewing
TERRI JENNINGS PERET , IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999)); cf John
0. McGinnis, Justice Without Justices, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 541, 541 (1999)
(proposing the elimination of "the position of Supreme Court Justice"). See
generally DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999).
244. Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 858,
860 (1990).
245. Matthew 20:16, 19:30; see also Mark 10:31; Luke 13:30.
246. Compare George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin
Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990) (criticizing the theology implicit in Justice
Scalia's jurisprudence) with Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson,
Scalia's Sermonette, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863 (1997) (defending a public
display of religious sentiment by Justice Scalia).
221
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
weapons of politics. The ghost of Justice Robert Jackson still
haunts the Court's hallowed halls: "The tools belong to the
[Justice] who can use them."247 Ironically enough, despite try-
ing his hardest to deny his own counsel, Justice Scalia has said
it best. "This is what this [Court] is about. Power."248
247. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
248. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
In this appendix we formally define the various voting in-
dices discussed in the text. Let X be the set of Supreme Court
Justices. There are three collections of subsets of X that we
will use in our analysis. Call a subset of the Justices a coalition
if they are exactly the set of Justices that joined some opinion
during the relevant time frame. Let R be the collection of coali-
tions where the number of appearances of a subset in R is equal
to the number of different opinions this subset joined. 249 From
R we construct the collection of subsets 0 by removing all but
one of each copy of a coalition. That is, in R the subset
[1,3,4,5,71 might appear five times but in 0 it will only appear
once. From the collection 0 we construct the feasible sets, de-
noted SC by computing all of the intersections of the sets con-
tained in 0, i.e.,
SC ={A I A = O1 n 0r2 ... n Ok, 01 s0}.
Let v be the function on subsets of X that identifies the
winning coalitions. That is, for each subset AcX,
v(A)=f1 if JAI >5,
0 if JAI < 4.
We can now formally define the different indices discussed
in the paper. The two indices defined by Baker use the data
from R. Baker's standard measure, BSM, assigns to each jus-
tice
BSM(x)=- Jv(A)
r {A RIxeA}
where the number r is chosen so that the sum YBSM(x)=1.
(XGX}
249. Thus, technically, R is not a set but a multi-set because elements in it
can appear more than once.
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The BSM index counts the number of times that a Justice ap-
peared in the majority. Baker's decision measure, BDM, as-
signs to each justice the index
BDM(x)=- 1 v(A)-v(A-x)
r {A6RIx A}
where r' is chosen, again, so that the sum of the indices is 1. In
other words, each Justice is assigned the number of times that
she appears in a coalition of size 5 (and then the index is nor-
malized to sum to 1.)
The next three indices we will define are based on the col-
lection 0. Our naive index, N, is defined by
N(x) = 1J ()vA x
S {Ar=ofxA}
where, again, the s is chosen so that the indices sum to 1. The
only difference between our naive index and Baker's decision
measure is that we consider coalitions in 0 and Baker consid-
ers the coalitions in R.
The median justice index, M, is defined by
M(x) =1 v(A),
t {AeOIxEA}
which is the analog to Baker's standard measure, where we
only consider the coalitions without multiplicity (and t is cho-
sen to normalize the sum.) Our Banzhaf index, B, is defined by
B(x)= _- Y v(A)-v(A-x)
S {AEOjxcA and A-xcO}
where s' is chosen so that the index sums to 1. It is easy to see
that B(x) counts the number of times that x is in a coalition A
contained in 0 of size 5 and the coalition A-x is also in 0. The
generalized Banzhaf index, GB, is defined the same way as B
only instead of using the collection 0 we use SC:
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GB (x)l=L, I vA-v
S1I {AeSClxeA and A-xESC}
We have encoded the data by assigning to each Justice a
number according to seniority, i.e., Chief Justice Rehnquist is
assigned 1, Justice Stevens is assigned 2, etc.. The raw data
sets R94-R99 are available from the authors. The computa-
tions discussed in the paper were performed using scripts in
Mathematica which are available from Paul Edelman.
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